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Abstract

McIntire, William David. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2014.
Information Communication Technologies and Identity in Post-Dayton Bosnia: Mending
or Deepening the Ethnic Divide

In the new digital world connected by ICT the methods and availability of communication have
not only transformed the way people interact, learn, and do business, it also has political
implications. ICT, specifically Web2.0 social media, increase the reach of campaigns and assist
in organizing and executing reform movements. The state of Bosnia-Herzegovina presents a
unique test case as it is a post-conflict state moving toward democratic consolidation that
emerged in 1995, when the World Wide Web was making inroads into daily life. The state is
divided, politically and socially, into ethnic cleavages. ICT in BiH has not been a vector for
major political reform like what was seen in the Arab Spring. It does however contribute to the
long term mending of cleavages and building of civil society through its use by nongovernmental organizations. It also allows, through principles of the contact theory, for citizens
to build inter-ethnic relationships.
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Chapter I: The Revolution Will [not] be Digitized? Information Technology, Politics, and
Society.
Introduction
In June of 2013 nearly 10,000 people took to the streets of Sarajevo to protest outside of
the House of Peoples (Dom Naroda), one of the two parliamentary houses of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, completely surrounding the building. The AP reports the protestors were a diverse
crowd comprised of Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks all voicing opposition to a governmental plan to
update the country’s identity card law—which lapsed in February of 2013. Lawmakers argued
whether the new identity cards, known as the Unique Master Citizen Number (JMBG), should
include a special digit identifying whether a baby is born in the Serbian dominated Republika
Srpska (RS) or the country’s other main political unit, the Croat and Bosniak Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). The press reports this change is seen as an attempt to further
divide the nation along ethnic lines and undermine efforts to further a unified state. The lapse
had left newborns without identification, meaning a child cannot qualify for healthcare or a
passport. The parents of one infant claimed their child died because the lack of state-issued
identification kept them from taking the child to a hospital in Belgrade.
The protests against the inability of lawmakers to find a solution subsequently spread to
other cities in the post-war nation of four million and was dubbed the Babylution (a portmanteau
of ‘baby’ and ‘revolution’). The protestors however were concerned with more than healthcare
access for newborns. They called for unity across ethnic lines and an end to the political system
built around maintaining and furthering those divisions. The protestors stated they were tired of
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“nationalistic excess” and politicians “thinking of ways to divide us.”1 The twitter hashtag
#JMGB was used to spread information, organize protests, and call out politicians. Dozens of
Facebook pages devoted to the JMGB protests were created, some with more “likes” than
Chairman of the Presidency Nebojša Radmanović’s official Facebook page. Numerous videos of
the protests as well as informational videos on the Babylution were uploaded to Youtube. Those
involved with the protests created the site, www.jmbg.org which included the message,
We are the citizens of this country – parents with children,
university students, housewives, workers, the unemployed,
pensioners, regardless of ethnic or religious groups, or any other
status, so it is in our common interest that the rights of every
person be respected, those of children above all. We address all
male and female citizens who wish to live in a state in which
politicians do their jobs and complete their legal obligations. A
state in which national and partisan interests are secondary and the
dignified and safe lives of citizens are primary.2
The above story is anecdotal but it illustrates a modern trend, the use of information
technology (ICT) as an instrument for reform movements. The use of the Internet and other
electronic forms of communication are now a significant factor in political activism. Some
scholars believe ICT make it easier for grass roots reform to be effective.3 Others are skeptical of
its utility without being coupled with tradition methods.4 This thesis seeks to add to the
discussion on ICT and politics by focusing on information technology and the evolution of ethnic
divisions in the post-conflict state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

1 Arnautovic, Marija. “Bosnian 'Baby-lution' Gains Force As Protesters Unite Across Ethnic Lines” Radio Free
Europe. June 12, 2013. Accessed June 20, 2013 http://www.rferl.org/content/bosnia-baby-lution-jmb-iinfantsdocumentation/25014979.html.
2 Gocmanac, Tamara. “Thousands Are Joining Bosnia's ‘Babylution’” Global Voices Online. June 20, 2013.
Accessed June 20, 2013 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/06/20/babylution/.
3 Lim, Merlyna, “The Internet, Social Networks, and Reform in Indonesia.”Contesting Media Power: Alternative
Media in a Networked World. 275-276.
4
Bailard, Catherine Snow. “The Internet's Influence on Democratic Satisfaction: A Cross-National Analysis.” PhD
diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2009.ProQuest (AAT 3374871). 02.

2

The sovereign state of BiH came to be in 1995 after a bloody civil war where belligerents
were divided along ethnic lines. In this conflict the once cosmopolitan city of Sarajevo, which
was host to the 1984 Winter Olympics became a killing field where snipers were commonplace
and residents were desperate for bare essentials such as food and water. After peace was
brokered the state found itself divided still along ethnic lines; however instead of partisan paramilitary groups physically segregating the parties, it was the top-down government structure that
cemented ethnicity into national politics. This thesis examines the ethnic foundations of BiH’s
governmental system and establishes whether grassroots efforts, specifically in the utilization of
ICT, are used to mend ethnic cleavages.
Hypothesis
This thesis continues the investigation into the nature of ICT and politics by focusing on
the ethnic divisions and consociational political framework of post-conflict BiH. The goal is
investigating if in post-conflict situations such as BiH, citizens utilize ICT to interact with
members beyond their ethnic community and if so, what the nature of that interaction is. The
interaction, if present, may be positive to mend cleavages and promote civil society. It could also
manifest itself in negative, regressing behavior such as promoting exclusion and maintaining, if
not broadening, societal exclusions and rendering further consolidation as a unified state
difficult.
Because the politics of BiH are structured in a way that reinforces ethnic divisions, it is
my contention that reform for a unified state is more likely to be found among the citizenry as
the elites have a vested interest in maintaining the heterogeneous status quo. The sub-hypothesis
of this study is that I expect to find that in situations where the ICT is grassroots based; that is, in
ICT usage not severely limited by the governmental power structure, interactions will be
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inclusive and reconciliatory. There are of course other possibilities; citizens may use ICT to
further divide the state in hopes of regions splintering off and joining neighboring states with
similar ‘ethnic makeup’ (specifically the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia).
Another possibility is that citizens adopt a pan-European approach and use ICT to promote a
European identity that downplays traditional classifications in hopes off acceptance into the
larger European community, specifically full member statues with the European Union. Finally,
there could be insufficient evidence that ICT is used in the manner suggested; this possibility is
itself fruitful because it addresses the debate in the literature on the nature of ICT in modern
political movements.
As BiH emerged as an independent state during the era when the Internet was coming
into being, a second sub-question that is likely to emerge is a case study on how ICT adaption
occurs in post-conflict states. Of specific importance in the case of BiH are the role of state
political actors as well as IGOs; specifically the European Union and the United Nations High
Representative on Bosnia.
This thesis addresses these issues with a review of identity, citizenship, political
satisfaction and trust in institutions in two main political entities of BiH; The Republika Srspka
and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lens through which these ideas are viewed is
the online activity of intergovernmental organizations (IGO), political actors (elected officials
and bureaucracy), non-governmental organizations (NGO), education, the diaspora community,
and private citizens. The study begins with an analysis of BiH’s political history and a review of
the political structure since the Dayton Peace Accords. The post-Dayton analysis is centered on
the coscotiational structure of the government and politics rooted in the state. The thesis utilizes
both quantitative statistical data and qualitative studies to answer the questions at hand.
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The genesis for this thesis is a working paper published by the University of Edinburgh’s
ongoing study institute, The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former
Yugoslavia (CITSEE).5 The paper found discourse in the traditional BiH media was biased in
favor of, or in opposition to, other ethnic groups. There are media outlets that were pro-Serb,
Pro-Croat, or pro-Bosniak in their reporting and story selection. The extended summary of the
paper notes that the influx of the Internet into the region provides an opportunity for discussions
on citizenship, and that this aspect is relatively unexplored.6 A second scholarly article aiding in
the formation of this theses asks, “if the Internet is understood by B&H audiences as a “virtual
Agora” (a place where they can promote their ideas), what kind of ideas are promoted on the
B&H part of the web and are they transferred to off-line life of B&H society afterwards or do
they stay in a “digital ghetto?”7 As seen in the above story on the June 2013 protest, there is
some use of ICT to promote political reform that not only is free of ethnic bias, but actively
seeks to eliminate questions of ethnicity in the formation of policy. Whether this instance is an
anomaly or the continuation of a trend is what is addressed in this study.
Operationalization
ICT
The concept of information and communication technology spans a great number of
information technology devices; however what can studied is limited by what data and primary
sources are available. Aside from secondary scholarship on the ICT in BiH, this study relies
heavily on primary source data collected by international organizations. The United Nations
5

CITSEE is sponsored by the European Research Council (ERC), an independent body that funds investigatordriven frontier research in the European Union and is part of the EU funded Seventh Research Framework
Programme.
6
Davor, Marko "Citizenship in Media Discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia" The
Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia (University of Edinburgh: 2012).
7
Turcilo, Lejla “New Media-Old Audiences: B&H and the Influence of Old Audiences.” Paper for Working Group
on Audience Interactivity and Participation. (European Cooperation in Science and Technology, 2010). 4
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International Telecommunication Union (ITU) does extensive research on ICT penetration and
proliferation throughout the world.8 The indicators are based on infrastructure/access and usage.
These variables include households with computers, Internet users, mobile broadband users, and
so forth. The ITU database is update through 2012. The variables indicated are not a perfect
picture of how people are utilizing communication technologies and the Internet, yet they
provide data on how accessible the technologies are. Published studies, both by academics and
institution white papers, provide a clearer picture of how the Internet and ICT in general are
being used in the state. When used in tandem, the ITU data and the secondary sources provide a
convincing picture of how ICT is utilized in BiH.
Societal Cleavages: Ethnicity
To study the influence of ICT on domestic politics it is first necessary to identify the
fissures within Bosnia. Ethnic identity politics are by their very nature complex, confusing, and
ever in a state of flux. This study focuses on the ethnic societal cleavages of the three main
national communities in BiH; Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks).
This classification is valid for two reasons. First, the collapse of Yugoslavia saw
independence movements centered on autonomy chiefly for Croats, Slovenians and Bosniaks.
Serbia perceived these secession movements to be at their own expense. Slovenia and Croatia
formed their own ethnically homogenous states while Bosnia and Herzegovina, another
Yugoslav breakaway republic, was ethnically mixed between Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs. The
peace plan resulted in the formation of semi-autonomous regions within BiH that are dominated
and seen as the de facto homeland for the three main ethnic groups within BiH; the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (mainly controlled by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats) and the Republika
Srpska and the Brčko District (both mainly governed by Bosnian Serbs). Moreover, political
8

The ITU data is compiled by the World Bank and is included in their Development Indicators.
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parties are built upon ethnic lines and the state operates under a power-sharing consociational
political framework.
The second reason for adopting the tri-ethnic classification is that it is the standard view
of BiH in the literature.9 Similarly, policy organizations such as the European Research Council,
and The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia
(CITEE) that study the ethnic issues within BiH use these classifications when presenting
findings to EU groups and governmental organizations in the form of policy recommendations.
Identifying these nationalities is important because it could influence the way ICT are
implemented and utilized by political actors. For an explanation of this I rely on the Diffusion of
Innovations Theory (DIT), which states that new technologies are adopted differently in each
society depending on the intentions of that state.10 A state where ethnicity is written into the
Constitution and policy makers gain positions of influence by the means of ethnic pandering
would likely see innovations implemented in a way to support the status quo. This theory should
be paired with the findings of Jason Brownlee that political leaders overwhelmingly make
decisions that result in gaining and maintaining power. Brownlee’s Authoritarianism in an Age
of Democratization (2007) finds that “regimes hold power in the face of societal mobilization so
long as significant rifts do not divide the ruling house against itself.”11 Therefore, a leader whose
constituency is one ethnic group finds ways to create and maintain that group’s hegemony at the
expense of others.
Similarly, it is in their direct interest to see that ICT are not used for promotion of a panBosnian or pan-European identity. ICT accessibility could be limited to the regions where the
9

O'Loughlin, John “Inter-Ethnic Friendships in Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina Sociodemographic and Place
Influences,” Ethnicities, Vol .10, No. 01, (2010), pg 53.
10
Rogers, Everett, Diffusion of Innovations (London: Free Press, 2003), pg 473.
11
Brownlee, Jason. Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratization. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 218.
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strongest political actors’ base lies. One group being more dominant on the Internet than another
would in turn influence the ICT dialogue that is observable. Under the DIT, it is plausible that
the ICT adopted into Bosnia, under the guidance of nationalistic leaders, is less useful for
bridging the ethnic fissures. This ensures, under Brownlee’s theory, that while ICT
“mobilization” is introduced there is no challenge to ethnic-party hegemony.
Changes in Cleavages
The heart of this study is to see if BiH citizens utilize ICT to discuss and promote
changes in inter-ethnic relationships. Ethnic identity is important in BiH because the political
structure of the state depends heavily on these divisions; and the future of the state depends on
whether these ethnic divisions prevent the consolidation of democracy.12 There are identifiers
noted in the literature that provide information on ethnic divisions and the relation to ICT—
specifically the Internet. This study focuses on five of these identifiers. The first is education.
The education of the youth in BiH is of crucial importance as they will inherit the state and either
continue or change the dynamic of ethnic cleavages. The second is civil society, including the
work of non-governmental organizations (NGO) that work outside of the auspices of
governmental control and seek to improve the social foundations of the state. The third is the
international community, specifically the organizations that work directly with the Bosnian
government to manage the state. International actors contribute to the domestic infrastructure
investment and thus can influence what groups have access to the Internet and which, if any,
numerically lag behind.13

The fourth is the Bosnian diaspora community as they lobby for

governmental change and work with the community still residing in the state. Finally of
importance is the use of ICT by the government, specifically the Internet use of political parties
12

O'Loughlin, “Inter-Ethnic Friendships,” 26-53
Norris, Digital Divide? Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide.(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 01-15.

13
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and bureaucratic organizations. Political actors may want ICT investment for the economic
benefits, but the Internet that is available may be limited to reduce challenges to established
political structure.14 Use of ICT could be connected to political party electoral success and
Bosnian democratic satisfaction.15 This notion is of importance because with a few exceptions,
the main political parties of BiH represent ethnic groups. Electoral victory and data on citizen
attitude toward the government couple with data on Internet usage can provide indicators on
whether citizens desire changes in the state divisions.
Within this thesis importance is given to the inter-ethnic relationships and identity of the
citizenry because it is fundamental to the both understanding the state and for its political
future.16 Of particular interest is whether citizens desire and seek inter-ethnic friendships and
whether they use ICT to achieve these goals. This includes the use of relevant surveys and
educational programs that are Internet based. Finally, general ICT usage patterns and Internet
traffic by Bosnian citizens is also studied. Similar to the June 2013 protests, this factor includes
qualitative evidence printed in established media, as well as social media interactions; while not
definitive it serves as ancillary evidence for what the surveys and literature state.
Methodology
While quantitative data is used, this thesis is a qualitative case study focused on the two
main political units of BiH: the Republika Srspka and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This preliminary chapter outlines the research question, defines methodology, and provides
examples in academic literature of ICT in state politics. The second establishes the groundwork

14

Javier Corrales, and Frank Westhoff,. “Information Technology Adoption and Political Regimes” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, (2006): pg 916 .
15
Bailard, “The Internet's Influence on Democratic Satisfaction,” 10.
16
Bakke, Kristin et al “Cooperation without Trust in Conflict Ridden Societies: Survey Results from Bosnia and the
North Caucasus.” (Manuscript Presented at 2006 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association
August, 31-September 3).
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for the hypothesis and focuses on qualitative studies and historical analysis of primary and
secondary sources. The third chapter utilizes both quantitative data and qualitative sources for
examining the main question of ICT and mending of ethnic cleavages. Chapter IV, the final
chapter, summarizes the findings and provides analysis of the case of ICT and ethnic cleavages
in BiH.
Chapter Summary
Chapter II of this thesis examines the ethnic divisions after the conclusion of the Bosnian
War in 1995. It establishes that the ethnic divisions in BiH are tangible and present a problem for
democratic consolidation. The chapter begins by defining ethnicity and establishing the
theoretical framework of constructivism through which ethnicity is viewed. The chapter then
provides a brief history of Yugoslavia (the South Slav state) in order to better understand the
circumstances preceding the war. From this, there is a discussion on the conscotiational form of
government adopted in post war BiH, including an analysis of the nation’s constitution and how
ethnicity is so intertwined with the very structure of the government.
Chapter III addresses the main hypothesis; are ICT used as a tool to in relation to ethnic
fissures in the post-conflict state of BiH. This chapter employs a multi-faceted examination of
ICT in BiH; using the framework established in the previous chapter by giving attention to both
international organizations and domestic actors. The chapter provides a brief history of ICT
infusion into the state in two phases; beginning with the post-Dayton period of 1995 to 2005 and
then from 2005 to 2012/3. This includes statistical data and analysis on infrastructure and
Internet usage. The chapter focuses specifically on civil society, NGO, IGO, Bosnian Diaspora,
and governmental use of ICT for political reform.
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Chapter IV provides the conclusion which reviews the nature of ICT in BiH and its use in
mending cleavages and influencing the discussion on the future of the state. It relates the
experiences studied in this thesis with other examples of ICT activism. It ends with a discussion
on future possible uses, specifically the role of NGOs as political actors.
Theory
Before beginning it is first necessary to operationalize “ethnicity” and establish a frame
work through which this thesis views it. Ethnicity is defined as “an identification of an individual
or group with a ‘people’ or ethnie. The membership of an ethnie may be defined by language,
religion, geographical location, the sharing of a common historical experience, or many other
criteria. The defining characteristic is that people consciously identity themselves as belonging
together.”17 Ethnicity is different from nationality as the latter is related solely to political
characteristics of a state, although ethnic groups can aspire to political autonomy. People who
ascribe an ethnicity hold that a common identity, or kinship, exists with others in their group
within the varied ways ethnicity can be defined. There is no consensus in the literature on what
constitutes an ethnicity, its origins, or its effect on politics; though there are many theories within
the field, two of the most common are primordialism and constructivism.
Primordialism asserts that ethnicity and ethnic identity is natural phenomena rooted in
ancient history, often including biological factors and territory.18 Primordialism further asserts
that once established, ethnic identity is “fixed” for future generations who cannot help being
attached to the identity.19 According to the theory, while these classically defined ethnicities “are
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not stamped on our genes,” they are very immutable and tend to endure.

20

According to Van

Evera, ethnic identity is hardened when inter-ethnic conflict exists as well as when mass literacy
is achieved as the sagas and symbols of the ethnicity can be passed along easier than in a time
where general histories of a people were not accessible.21 Primordialism’s foundation is based in
ancient ethnic lines that are passed down through the generations, these ethnic features form a
cultural bond, or kinship, among the members and inter-ethnic strife is virtually unavoidable.
The ethnic divisions in BiH viewed through a primordial lens finds the three main ethnic
groups to be locked in competition that existed well before the collapse of Yugoslavia. Ethnic
divisions were relevant there before the First and second World Wars and certainly played a part
in both the actions and outcome of those conflicts. The divisions were perhaps maintained but
did not disappear under Tito’s Yugoslavia.22 Van Evera, commenting on the post-Dayton
reconstruction of the state finds that the creation of a pan-Bosnian or Pan-European identity in
BiH is impossible even if strong inter-ethnic relationships such as marriage are common; efforts
to morph identity will meet failure, which, he asserts, is why the international community still
policies BiH even though hostilities ended in 1995. They only real hope is muting the more
dangerous aspects of ethnic divisions to make the relationship between the groups more benign
and the groups less threatening to the each other.23
Constructivists view ethnicity as a product of agency, a tool used by elites to rally or
exploit a constituency for political power.24 Unlike primordialism, the origins of the ethnicity is
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not particularly important, it is simply a means to achieving an end.25 The manufacturing of
ethnicity is intentional, though long standing cleavages can be utilized. Another difference is that
fluctuations in identity are not uncommon if it serves the larger purpose of obtaining and
maintaining hegemony and for “enforcing membership into coalitions.”26 Constructivists find the
theory particularly useful in discussing societies that lack ethnic homogeneity.27
Constructivism holds that political actions depend heavily on normative values and how
actors view phenomena; agency is crucial and shapes the way situations are perceived. This
theory is well suited for examining issues of ethnicity as it sees identity as a key variable in
understanding politics as it emphasizes unit-level analysis, “the relationship between social and
legal norms and the identities and interests of states.”28 Social relations and identity, according to
constructivists, will influence how political actors will behave in relation to the state and what
choices they make.29 Constructivist theory holds that identity and norms are not fixed, they are
intangible ideas that can change over time; As Wendt states, “identity is the basis of interests;”
international and domestic politics exist in a world of anarchy and anarchy is what we make of
it.30
Constructivists view the Bosnian War as a power struggle that resulted in the political
vacuum after the death of the strong-leader Marshall Tito. The collapse after the 1991 secession
of Slovenia allowed for opportunist rulers to divide the country and promote ethnic sovereignty
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as the caus de guerre. Without the pressure by local elites, there would not be inter-ethnic
conflict. Before the collapse of the state the three groups interacted harmoniously, thus the ethnic
competition was an artificial “astro-turf” creation by nefarious leaders looking to gain and retain
power.31 The constructivists provide a political approach to understanding the foundations of
ethnicity and how these cleavages can ultimately lead to conflict.
Constructivist V.P. Gagnon asserts that “violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is
provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only
politically relevant identity.”32 Conflict was the result of elites striving to achieve more power in
the wake of domestic issues by using ethnic scapegoats. In the case of Serbian nationalist
resurgence, Milosevic blamed economic problems, which had nothing to do with ethnicity, on
other groups who he deemed were the enemies of Serbia. The focus on ethnic cleavages works
in the example of BiH as the Communist Party was the sole political entity. Thus placing blame
on opposition parties was not an option. In the case of Yugoslavia, there existed few serious
cleavages between groups, the ethnically mixed regions did not want to go to war with one
another, yet violence was “imposed by forces from outside.”

33
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selective manner upon history to make conflict appear as if it is inevitable, and the only path left
for the survival of the state or people. As a result of manufactured rivalries for political gain in
the face of non-ethnic difficulties, violence emerged. The implantation of “violence on a scale
large enough to affect international security is the result of purposeful and strategic policies
rather than irrational acts of the masses.”34
31
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Mueller observes the conflict in the Balkans as emerging “not out of inevitable historic
necessities, but were instigated and orchestrated by designing politicians and local extremists
who, however, often did not know how to control the violent processes they had set into
motion.”35 Ethnicity is an ordering device that calls certain segments of society to action.
Mueller identifies these segments as the criminals, thugs, hooligans and lowlifes. The elites often
do not have full control over the military, but their rhetoric can provoke criminals to take their
message to the extreme and engage in violence. In the case of Bosnia, Serbian football fans
formed their own paramilitary groups that would harass Croats and Bosniaks. The thugs carry
out the goals of the elites without being directly controlled by them, in the same way a leader
controls army. As Mueller states that these thugs focus on one targeted group and that group
leaves the area out of fear. Those who match the thugs ideal person would, perhaps reluctantly,
come to recognize the thugs as their protectors against reprisals.36 In that way the cycle of
violence grows.
Finally, Crawford and Lipschutz hold that identity does not dictate what individuals do, it
is the individuals who drive identity and what it means to belong or be excluded from the group.
Identity politics are a means to an end in which history is used selectively to justify action, not to
render an action inevitable. Identities are “politically constructed during periods of upheaval by
certain members of political and economic elites, who we can call ‘political entrepreneurs’.”37
This thesis uses constructivist theory in its analysis as it stresses the importance of
malleability of identity and how identity influences the way citizens of BiH interact with others
as well as the legal and political institutions of the state, the latter being the focus of this chapter.
35
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It also provides a deeper explanation than those presented by the primordialist theory.
Primordialism seeks to provide the foundation of ethnic identity; however it does not fully
address how these identities influence interaction with institutions. Moreover, Van Evera, even
in his defense of primordialism, states that ethnicity is indeed a social construction.38 A purely
“primordial explanation towards inter-ethnic violence cannot explain the degree to which it
proliferated and intensified.
Elites in BiH very well use ethnicity as a tool for power, but that a unit level synopsis
constructivism provides also explores all actors and institutions. Furthermore, noting a politician
presents themselves as the Bosniak candidate still requires understanding the construction of the
Bosniak identity and its relation to institutions. Understanding the normative values and
meanings associated with and toward Bosniaks, and how those values at play in domestic sphere
is important to understanding the politics of BiH;

in the same way that Wendt finds

understanding that during the Cold War nuclear weapons held by the UK had a different
meaning than those possessed by China.39
The conflict in Bosnia was then not a matter of biology or ancient hatred coming to the
forefront, it is the contention of this study that the fissures were deliberately designed by elite
who sought improve their own standings. Furthermore, these cleavages were cemented by the
actions of the international community operating in the state. The war was a product of
individuals in which the causes are a “recent rather than an ancient phenomenon.”40 This is
specifically what Horowitz describes as the “modernization and economic interest perspectives
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of ethnic conflict where rivalry is promoted by elite for political power and among non-elite for
economic competition.”41
Literature Review: ICT and Political Movements
The proponents of Internet technology as a vehicle for political change view ICT as a
trump card, an equalizer in the great chess game of man versus state. The enthusiasm was flamed
by those who viewed the technology as a means to fulfill Huntington’s promise of the “Third
Wave” and bring about Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history.”42 The Internet is viewed by many
proponents as a technology that levels the playing field allows anyone wanting to perform
meaningful activism.43 Proponent authors state the Internet changes the government-citizen
relationship in favor of citizens; strengthens grassroots movements; decentralizes media sources
and information; and strengthens democratic culture and institutions.44
Though the field of ICT and politics may seem relatively new, but there is a wealth of
published scholarship in this area. Major research universities have undertaken a study on
information technology and society. In 1996 Harvard University established the Center on Law
and Technology, now called the Berkman Center for Internet and Society.45 The UK’s Oxford
University followed suit when it opened its Oxford Internet Institute in 2001. In the same year,
the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto began its Citizen Lab
program to study the impact of the web. Scholarly journals began reviewing literature and
publishing articles on the ICT and politics; for example the History of Information became a
41
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popular subfield in some academic institutions.46 The Journal of E-Government (now Journal of
Information Technology and Politics), a scholarly journal devoted to the topic, was founded in
2004.47 Investigation an impact of the Internet on society was apparently prominent enough that
it gained the attention and resources of top universities and journals.
International Organizations
As stated above, an area of importance in this study is the role of international
organizations, particularly the European Union, in shaping post-war BiH. These organizations
had a goal for the future of the state, and these goals could include the infusion of ICT it was
deemed important. As the literature shows, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations have a history of promoting ICT in foreign states.
In the decade after the foundation of the world-wide-web, many well established
intergovernmental organizations, seeing the potential of Internet technology, retooled their
efforts to include Internet advocacy to the developing world.

In 1992, The International

Telecommunications Union (ITU), the leading United Nations agency for information and
communication technology issues, established the Telecommunication Development Sector
(ITU-D) to “spread equitable, sustainable and affordable access to information and
communication technologies” to the developing world.48 The work of the ITU is built upon by
the UN’s World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which meets to establish goals and
tactics to increase ICT opportunities in developing states.
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In 2003 the World Bank included the promotion of the Internet and ICT in the
developing world as a Millennium Development Goal in order to make governments more
transparent, increase education, and increase trade opportunities.49 The International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which opened its first website in 1996, similarly linked the technology to better
fiscal transparency that accompanied ICT technology, stating that the Internet “reduce surprises
for markets and aid policymakers in implementing sound economic policies.”50 Like the IMF,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development crafted studies detailing how the
Internet has created economic opportunity for the “first billion users” and that efforts to increase
availability would result in economic, and possibly, political prosperity.51
Grassroots Movements
As noted, the political structure of BiH is built upon ethnic power sharing agreements.
This could serve to reinforce existing norms and make top down change undesirable or political
inexpedient. The scholars in the field have stated that ICT is a tool for grassroots reform when
other methods are viewed as ineffective.52 An excellent example of a movement that utilized the
Internet to bring about democracy can be found in the case of Indonesia in the late 1990s.
Suharto served as President of Indonesia from 1967 to 1998. Although officially serving
under the title of president through elections, his administration fell drastically short of the
conditions for a liberal democracy. The number of Internet users in 1998 was estimated at about
one percent of the population, about 900,000 users, and this was group was believed to be made
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of the elite and largely for financial purposes.53 Though the total number of users in a country
with a then population of roughly 210 million was relatively small, the openness provided a
“vehicle for dissent” for the grassroots student movement that eventually brought down the
Suharto regime in what was called the “Net’s first revolution.” The rising middle class, which
flourished during the New Order economic liberalization, created a generation of frustrated
youth which longed for political openings. These students “were among the first to embrace the
new technology” at their universities, while many more were “gaining net access through lowcost cyber cafes.”54 It was through the universities and the Internet cafes, or “warnets,” that the
seeds for revolution grew.55 This resulted in a pro-democracy movement called the Reformasi
that ousted the president on May 21 1998.
In the case of Indonesia, the Internet did not serve as the basis for the revolt, but it
allowed the users to organize online for the coordination of protests and demands for democratic
reform. As Lim notes, “as the crisis broke, Indonesian authorities had no geared-up plans for
controlling or censoring the Internet and were quite naïve about its political potential.”56 In this
way we see that even one percent of the population can work for reform when the Internet is not
restricted. It may not have been necessary, but it was sufficient to hasten the end of the Suahrto
regime and create reforms where the control of the state resisted more in the ballot box than at
the end of a bayonet.
Political Parties
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In BiH political parties as they are overwhelming connected to ethnic groups. This study
examines the use of social media, party websites, and interaction between citizens and the
politicians. Political scientist Larry Diamond argues that political party participation is an
essential component of democratic consolidation—which post-conflict BiH is working toward at
this time. He states “not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a significant opposition vote
and presumption of party alienation in government, but no group that adheres to constitutional
principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections.”57 As we saw in the case of
Indonesia, a “democracy” without any real competition is often just a façade for a strong man
dictator.
If the BiH political parties are safe due to ethnic ‘Gerrymandering’ it is possible they are
heedless to the demands of the people—as evidence shows in the signs and slogans stated by
demonstrators in the June 2013 protests in Sarajevo. The political party establishment could use
the ‘dark side’ of ICT to further the ethnic divide, or, as Diamond alludes, citizens could ICT to
start political parties or lobby established ones for reform. A method for discovering whether a
political party is viable is by its ability to present policy and gain members. Two instances where
the Internet has served to strengthen political parties are found in the cases of England and
Russia. One entered the Internet age as a consolidated democracy, the other is a Soviet Successor
state that struggled with severe domestic issues related to democratization.
The collapse of the Soviet economic and political system in the early 1990s ushered in an
era of democratic and market reforms in the former communist bloc. The creation of viable
political parties was part of the reforms to create a democratic country. The Russian Federation,
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for instance, had over 197 political parties by 2001.58 The advent of the World Wide Web
occurred at the same time as these Russian reforms and the information technology presented
itself as a natural marriage for political organizing. Although the total number of Internet users in
Russia has been historically low (roughly 10 percent of the population), the number of users was
the “fastest growing in Europe in 1999-2000.”59 Moreover, similar to the case in Indonesia, those
online were generally the elite who the pioneers in establishing the parties.60 This is crucial as, if
we work with Brownlee’s assertions, it is these elite who are fundamental in bringing political
reforms.61 The online (Internet) presence of established political parties, according to Römmele,
serve as an “additional channel for the distribution of material and a medium for campaign
management, it also enables region-wide mobilization of the active party base. For new parties in
particular, such developments provide the means to building an organizational infrastructure that
avoids the usual costs of regional headquarters.”62 The Russian Internet, at this time, was viewed
as the last uncensored source for information.63 Rash describes the Internet as a force multiplier,
which “makes your resources seem larger and more effective than they really are and in the
process may give you greater capabilities.”64 Moreover, the Russian parties on the net influence
offline activity, including the building of coalitions and dissemination of information is useless
unless it leads to real world results.65
The Internet in the case of the UK, a consolidated democracy, will not “revolutionize”
democracy, yet it has succeeded to “strengthen communication pluralism and widen the
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availability of information available about electoral choices.”66 Norris notes, “the direction of
party messages will tend to reflect traditional hierarchical Weberian power structures [as] most
party communications will therefore tend to be ‘top-down’, flowing from the party leadership
and elected representatives towards the grassroots and the electorate.”67 The materiel available
for supporters to use in civic engagements was the main reason why people visited party
websites. The second most common reason was to organize for specific campaigns, causes, and
protests.68
Finally, smaller, or “fringe parties” used the net to gain “a greater voice and visibility”
than what would be possible in through traditional media sources. Smaller parties such as the
Unionists and the inclusive Alliance Party of Northern Ireland can reach more voters online as
their platform and materials were freely available for anyone to access.69
Civil Society
The formation of civil society outside of political parties is described by Larry Diamond
as “…multiple, ongoing channels for expression and representation of interests and values,
including diverse, independent associations and movements, which [citizens] have the freedom
to form and join.”70 The creation of civil society is often noted as crucial to creating and
maintaining a democratic society’ specifically through the building of trust, community, and
deliberation.71 The question of whether the Internet can facilitate civil society has historically
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been a topic of debate among scholars.72 We can look to Mongolia from 1996-2006 as an
example where there was an attempt to use the Internet as a tool for constructing civil society.
Mongolia is another success story of the Third Wave of Democratization, emerging as a
constitutional democracy in the early 1990s. Mongolia embraced neoliberal economic
restructuring shortly after achieving political reforms. As a result of privatizing and foreign
investment, “The Internet is the first electronic media to develop in Mongolia after the collapse
of the socialist regime and Soviet domination.”73 In the decade of 1996-2006, the number of
Internet users per 100 persons in Mongolia increased from 0.01 to 7.6.74 The Mongolian
government has been friendly to increases in Internet technology, the Mongolian Information
Development Association (MIDAS) established in 2000 the Vision for Developing Information
and Communication Technology in Mongolia by year 2010. The goal of the MIDAS program is
to integrate information technology into Mongolian political, civil, and economic life. This
includes access to educational material and hosts for several online newsmagazines that host
very lively and “unfiltered” message boards.75 Furthermore, expat/diaspora websites such as
MGLclub, are noted by Baasanjav to strengthen democratic practices through the discussion of
civil society principles with Mongolians living in established democratic countries.76
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Illiberal Speech and Government Restriction of Content
States in transition fail to recognize the potential of the Internet to achieve the same goals
of traditional media and also surpass it in means of political organization.77 This is particularly
the case in states that are ‘less free’ than others. The “ICT sphere is the incarnation of
globalization,” and its integration presents additional problems in the instances of states where
elites may be cautious if their state is not sufficiently open and transparent and full democracy is
not a clear, shared goal.78 The Internet, ideally, creates an open communication space and
possibilities for pluralism. A state accustomed to centralization and closed methods of
communication find the Internet contradictory as it represents a “free zone with no guards at the
door.”79 This is the very situation alluded to by Brownlee as elites will manage a political and
economic system to their advantage. Similarly, as the Diffusion of Innovations Theory states, a
nation will implement an innovation in the way that benefits their situation the most. Under the
constructionist ethnic theory, elites are forging the political and social climate, it seems fitting
that governmental incursion would be a real issue.
The OpenNet Initiative, a collaborative partnership between university and think tanks to
study Internet access, finds governments particularly those in states categorized as ‘less free’ will
implement the Internet for its economic gains but place serious limitations on what can be done
online. They document deliberate blocking of specific Internet domains through the use of
electronic “friewalls.” These domains often include sites that elites believe could serve as a
threat to their hegemony (western media outlets, webpages on democracy, and so on).80 Leslie
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Simon of the Woodrow Wilson Center finds similar results; the Internet can be fruitful for
furthering democracy, yet the largest gains are in states already consolidated. States that are in
transition or are not democratic will see governments use ICT as a propaganda tool or to monitor
the actions of civilians through IP addresses and other electronic monitoring methods.81
Governments must be receptive of it, accept it in their states, and adapt communication (news,
constituent outreach, initiatives) to it.82
There is also the issue of actors using social media to exacerbate cleavages. Social media
was used by Albanians and Macedonians in Skopje to express ethnic based anger. The social
media posts included hate speech, threats, and calls for war. Off-line hatred would not be
unexpected online especially when anonymity is given.83 This allows users to express feels of
inter-ethnic anger toward a target without paying a negative social cost.
Alternative Media
As noted above, traditional media sources in BiH can be biased in favor of one ethnic
group over another. Academics have noted the possibility for the Internet to provide an
additional source of information that operates outside of the traditional media.84 Diamond argues
that in a liberal democracy, “There are alternative sources of information (including independent
media) to which citizens have (politically) unfettered access.”85 In the West, citizens are familiar
with the importance of multiple, independent media and news sources. The Internet, by its very
nature, is a natural venue for the dissemination of information. News and information websites
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originating outside a country’s borders can be accessed from within. More traditional methods
media (television and print, for example) are easier to control.
In case of Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, the protestors used the Internet to counter
the regimes monopoly on information.86 One of the most outspoken protest groups was a civic
youth organization known as Pora!, which is Ukrainian for It’s Time!. Pora! was “singled out for
harassment by the authorities because its excellent organization and appeal to young people
made it extremely dangerous.”87 Pora! chose to make their case online as they believed the
Internet was the exploitable weak point. There was very little access to alternative sources of
information in the Ukraine where all but one of the television stations was controlled by the
regime.88 Because of this control, the traditional media sources were regarded as “propaganda
dressed up as neutral journalism.”89 Pora! established a series of Ukranian .ua domain websites
to keep voters informed about the protests, election information, and voter’s rights.90 This
alternative source of information kept Ukrainians informed and applied pressure to the regime.
The Orange Revolution resulted in a run-off election, overseen by international observers, in
which the opposition candidate won. Leaders of the main opposition to Viktor Yanukovych
noted that the Pora!-run websites, because of their ability to supply independent sources of
information, were more important in achieving victory than physical protests.91
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Ethnic Minority Expression
As this study is focused on ethnic divisions in a state, studies on ethnic minority activism
are of particular benefit. For liberal democracy to flourish, Diamond asserts that “cultural, ethnic,
religious and other minority groups [cannot be] prohibited from expressing their interests in the
political process or from speaking their language or practicing their culture.”92 In this case
Diamond is arguing that a democracy cannot flourish if the majority is repressive to a minority—
whether the minority be religious, ethnic, linguistic, or other. Citizens should, according to
Diamond, be free to engage in the system politically without fear of subjugation. One instance
where we see minority groups using the web to lobby for domestic recognition and freedom to
participate politically in the state is with Mexico’s Zapatistas.
The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) is a leftist revolutionary movement
located in the Southeastern Mexican state of Chiapas. The EZLN is comprised primarily of
indigenous Mayan Indians who oppose what they see as oppressive policies of the Mexican state.
While the movement turned into armed revolt in 1994, the group’s origins lie with their hero
Emiliano Zapata, a major figure and champion of land reform during the 1910 Mexican
Revolution.93
The EZLN struggle is considered the first instance of net-warfare.94 The importance of the
Internet to the EZLN is apparent as the group representing the rural poor was online within two
days of announcing the rebellion.95 The Internet was used to “disseminate information about the
indigenous struggle in Chiapas around the world and open the space for the creation of networks
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of transnational support.”96 As a result of this global support, sympathetic westerners lobby their
governments to pressure Mexico, the net based marketing has been “crucial for the movement
because [it] has bolstered [the EZLN] position with the Mexican Government.97
ICT and Political Movements
The examples of the Internet having an influence on democratic movements reveal
several trends. First, the Internet’s impact is not as potent as cyber-enthusiasts would like it to be.
To call the Internet completely ineffective in the political realm is perhaps too harsh; it is, better
stated, a tool still maturing in its technological features and number of users. The examples
above show that the Internet may not be necessary to impose small political change, but it has
been sufficient in some ways. The impact, though small, is real. The piecemeal victories
underwritten by digital activity certainly add a level of optimism for the future of the technology.
The second trend, naturally related to the first, is that the Internet is most effective in
states with some form of established democratic tradition. The examples where the Internet
served as a valuable tool occurred almost exclusively in democratic states. This is not to say that
the Internet cannot be an asset for opposition movements in non-democratic states. The examples
show, however, that the success of the technology is most apparent in helping to consolidate new
democracies; those who emerged from the authoritarian Iron Curtain.
The third trend we see from the examples is that the Internet tends to function as a topdown technology. This is not surprising as a common criticism of the technology is that it is used
by elites for elite agendas, it seldom is solely a domain for pure grass-roots organizing. This
however is in line with the Diffusion of Innovations Theory: the elites are the first to adopt the
technology and format the technology to meet their goals and standards. Moreover, we find this
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trend to mesh well with Brownlee’s theory on political change: meaningful political
transformations, especially in less-democratic states, are frequently fomented by society’s elites.
The final trend we see emerge from the literature is that economics play a role in the success of
net based political movements. The examples of Internet achievements in Mexico, Indonesia,
Russia, and Mongolia were grounded in economic considerations. The economic variable
manifested itself in several ways.
1. The desire of governments to further incorporate the state into the world market brought
in an Internet that was unregulated (Indonesia).
2. The net-based outreach by reform movements were considered by the government
because a violent backlash could hurt investment opportunities (Mexico).
3. Neoliberal privatization (through foreign investment) brought the Internet to newly
democratic states (Mongolia).
Based on these findings the focus on both IGO attitude and domestic plans for ICT is,
according to the literature, crucial for understanding the use of ICT and ethnic politics in the
state of Bosnia Herzegovina. The purpose of this thesis is not to find definitive answers on the
nature of ICT in the post-conflict state, it seeks to build upon the existing literature and continue
the dialogue of how information technology manifests itself in this brave new digital world.
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Chapter II: International Partners and the Consociational Framework of the Bosnia and
Herzegovina State.
In December of 2008, thousands of Bosnians joined the Facebook group “Close Group
Noz Zica Srebrenica," over six-thousand of which joined in the first 48 hours of the group’s
opening.98 The members were protesting a Serbian Nationalist Facebook group titled 'Noz, Zica,
Srebrenica,’ which translates to “The Knife, The Wire, Srebrenica.” This alluded to the 1995
Srebrenica Massacre, Europe's worst atrocity since World War Two, in which over 8,000
Boniaks were detained and killed by Serbian Nationalist forces. The Noz Zica Srebrenica
Facebook group, which was written in Serbian Cyrillic script, listed itself as place for "all those
who think that Muslims are best on the spit and while swimming in sulfuric acid."99 Aside from
the “Close Group Noz Zica Srebrenica,” Facebook group, which reportedly had over 19,000
members by mid-December, the story was picked up by several BiH related blogs including the
expat Bosniak group The Congress of North American Bosniaks (CNAB), which called for
Bosnia to strive to be an inclusive, united country. 100
The above story is yet another anecdote on the ethnic divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH) finding its way to the realm of social media. This chapter examines the issue of ethnic
cleavages by looking at the institutional framework through which they endure. It accomplishes
this task with an a look at recent historical between the primary actors, an analysis of the Bosnian
governmental structures established by the Dayton Agreements and by examining the role of
international partners, specifically the European Union.
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History of a “South Slav” State
The “Yugoslav Idea,” the notion that the people living in the Balkans should be united, is
not an idea born in the Post-WWII restructuring of Europe. The South Slavic people (Yugoslav
means South Slav) have historically existed in a unique geographical area. They found
themselves buttressed against great empires of early-modern Europe; Ottoman, Russian, and
Austro-Hungarian (and the Kingdom of Hungary before it). Each empire had particular interest
in the fate of the region and sought to influence its political future.101
Pertinent to the understanding of a unified Yugoslavia is the politics of the AustroHungarian Empire (1867-1918). Pedro Rament, utilizing Kaplan’s typologies of systems of
international behavior, finds the Austro-Hungarian Empire classifies as “perhaps one of the
clearest examples of a tight bi-polar system.”102 The empire was never unified into one
bureaucratic system; it maintained separate institutions for education, postage, judiciary,
taxation, and transportation among others. The two Austrian and Hungarian halves competed
with each other and often clashed over foreign policy as well as internal power struggle. The
Austrian monarchy, hoping to create a wedge that could counter Hungarian interests (and
promote those of the Austrian half) promoted the idea of South Slav unification.103 This was
structured around Austrian support for Croats as the arbiter of this Yugoslav unification, or
“trialism” as it is referred to.104 Croatia, which had some historical context as a sovereign state,
was willing to carry the torch of unification on behalf of the Austrian crown—it previously
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existed under tutelage of Hungarian rule and underwent a period of romantic nationalism during
the tumultuous European revolutions of 1848.
This trialism saw the creation of academies bearing the moniker “Yugoslav” and adopted
resolutions acknowledging, if not implementing, some ideas of self-governance.105 After the
1878 Treaty of Berlin, in which the Kingdom of Serbia gained independence from the Ottoman
Empire, The Austrian administration occupied the Ottoman-held land of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a
land that contained South Slavs who were religiously followers of the Islamic faith. The Croatian
leaders regarded the Bosniak population not as a separate ethnic entity, but as an extension of
their own Slavic people and thus integration into the trialistic system would not be a challenge.106
This idea of Croat-Bosniak Yugoslav homogeneity is accentuated in a 1936 statement by the leftleaning Croatian peasant Party politician Vladko Maček, “…the entire Croat nation considers the
Bosnian Muslims to be the purest part of the Croatian nation,” Maček’s political rival, fascist
Ustase member Ante Pavelic agreed, stating in 1938, “…Bosnia is the heart of Croatian state,
and the Muslim tribes part of the Croatian nation.”107 It was the Austrian administration,
however, that fostered a sense of separate “Bosnian identity” among the Muslim population in
order to play them off of Croatian and Orthodox interest; very much in the same way it used panYugoslav idealism to counter Hungary.108 There is even a debate within the field that the
assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, which sparked World War One, was undertaken
because the Austro-Hungarian Empire stood in the way of a national homeland for the South
Slave peoples.109
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When the ashes of World War One settled, the pan-Yugoslav trialism forged the creation
of a new state uniting the South Slaves—the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941/5). This
kingdom was supported by both of the major Yugoslav groups, the Croats and Serbs. The South
Slavic peoples now had a homeland, a sovereign state, but the new challenged presented was
how it should be governed. Ramet finds the politics of Kingdom of Yugoslavia to suffer the
same issues of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in that it was a bi-polar system in which, “two
permanently hostile core powers around which lesser powers cluster in a non-random fashion
that approximates equal distribution of allies.”110 The result is polarization into camps and
competition. Both the Croatian and Serb political leaders saw themselves as the champion of the
Yugoslav people, the heirs and protectors. These were the two largest and most influential Slavic
groups in the new state. Historian John Keegan writes, “Yugoslavia’s unequal racial composition
might have been brought into balance with good will; as events turned out, the determination of
the Orthodox Christian Serbs to dominate, particularly over the Catholic Croats, undermined its
coherence from an early date.”111 The political leaders, hoping to gain an advantage, used small
differences between the polities to accentuate otherness. These include the Croatian use of the
Latin script while Serbs used Cyrillic and, in the same vein, matters of adherence to Catholicism
versus Orthodox faiths.
The new kingdom was dominated by Serbians who staffed the government and
bureaucracy. Unlike Croatia which was under the Austro-Hungarian rule, Serbia existed as an
independent state and had the structure for administration in place. Serbian political elites backed
a “Serbianization” program and attempted to run the state on a unitary basis and disregard
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Croatian leaders.112 This Serb-Croat rivalry would dominate the interwar period.113 A main point
of contention was control over the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina as neither the Croats nor Serbs
held a majority there. Each side courted the Muslim population, which tended to be allied with
the Serbs in its outlook on politics.
The examination of the period from the mid-19th Century to the dawn of World War II
matches Ramet’s analysis of Kaplan’s typology of systems of international behavior for bi-polar
models. Within this model we see two opposing forces of generally equal strength who view
politics as a zero sum game. Croatia was a lesser ally in the bi-polar Hapsburg system and then
saw themselves as an equal in competition with another partner. Interwar Yugoslavia is different
than that of better known bi-polar models such as the Cold War, because in the Cold War the
rivalry was between two sovereign states that saw their interests at odds with each other. In
Yugoslavia, the conflict was domestic among competing political leaders. These leaders found
ethnicity (and variables that comprised it such as religion and written language) as the most
convenient tool to seek hegemony. Ramet states that, “It appears that group interest may be
monolithic at least within the context of intergroup conflict, for regardless of what the real
interests of Croatian peasants, merchants, sailors, priests, and intellectuals may have been, they
united to support the same program in the conviction that their principle foe was one in the same
(Serbian Hegemonism).”114
These pan-Slavic movements were not based primarily on ethnocentrism, but a desire for
autonomy for all South Slavic people. The pan-Slavic movement emerged in the area when
revolutions of liberalism and nationalism spread throughout Europe. The pan-Slavic movements
on the outset, however, did not promote ethnic-nationalism of one group while disregarding the
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next. Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and various other southern Slav intellectuals sought a homeland
where all would exist in a singular state. The literature reviewed does not point to instances of
groups being excluded or given ‘other’ status until the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
after WWI. On the contrary, the political elite of the two main groups, Croats and Serbs,
embraced the unified state and both regarded Bosniaks as natural partners.
Events outside of the Balkans may provide a key to understanding the change in interethnic relations. The inter-war period saw the rise of fascism in Europe and unfortunately,
internal antipathies were to rob [Yugoslavia] of the power to resist Italian and German attack in
1941.”115. Mussolini viewed the Dalmatian coast as part of his sphere of influence and worked
closely with, and supported, fascist leaders there (Croatian Ustase Party).116 Hitler’s National
Socialism was based much more in racial politics than was Mussolini’s. The NSDAP’s Aryan
weltanschauung included Croats, Slovenians, and Bosniaks but excluded the Serbs who were
deemed as Slavic and therefore irreconcilable with the racial politics of National Socialism. The
fascist Croatian Ustase Party, with help from Germany and Italy, gained control of the Croatian
political establishment in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia thus the political elites incorporated a new
ethnocentrism against the Serbs who elites now referred to as different from them-- before, in the
1920’s, the agenda was trialism and other south Slavic groups were at least rhetorically treated as
equal partners.
The Balkans suffered a great deal of violence during the Second World War. Not only
was Yugoslavia occupied by the fascist armies of Mussolini and Hitler, but it also descended into
a destructive and complex civil war that pitted, among other factions, the Nazi-back Croatian
Ustase against Yugoslav partisans. At the end of the war Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) served as
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President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a post he held from 1953 until his
death in 1980. Yugoslavia under Tito was divided into six socialist republics operating under the
federal government in Belgrade: Bosnia-Herzegovnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia,
and Slovenia. Two other provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were within the republic of Serbia
but enjoyed a degree of autonomy.117
As is evident, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was divided primarily along lines that
gave ‘established ethnic communities’ their own state. Thus the pan-South Slav state had
elements of ethnic cleavages in the political framework, though none of the states was a pure
homogenous state demographically. The Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were the three largest
ethnic groups in the county. Within the Tito period there was generally an aura of calm on ethnic
tensions; however it must be noted that several constitutional conventions were held to debate
problems related to Croatian and Serbian sovereignty within the state. In 1981, the year of Tito’s
death, Serbs were thirty-six percent of the nation Croats were twenty percent, and Muslims held
nine percent of the population.118 The most heterogeneous state was BiH which had majority
Muslim but still a strong presence of Croat and Serbian residents, they represented the second
and third most heavily populated groups in the area.
It appears that Tito gave BiH its status as a republic within Yugoslavia is because it
would balance between the competing states of Serbia and Croatia. It was feared giving it or
dividing between the two would give one advantage over another which would weaken a system
built on unity. Rament finds that many political figures in Yugoslavia considered the Muslims in
BiH to be the “least nationalistic” of all groups in Yugoslavia, meaning that there were not
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particularly well organized or vocal in comparison to other actors.119 The Croats and Serb leaders
in particular were quick to deny the existence or even possibility of a Muslim nation or separate
ethnic group. A great debate began on who the Muslims were and what their origins could be,
The two sides claimed the Muslims were of their people, each side claimed the rights to BiH
stating that the Muslim population were members of their own polity who converted under
Ottoman rule and therefore, if secession was discussed, BiH was rightfully a province of their
own states.120
The Rise of Milosevic: The End of the South Slav Experiment
The late 1960s saw and era of economic and political reform as Yugoslavia was the
foremost member of the nonaligned movement. The 1960s to saw an attempt to institute a
“modernized self-management” style; in that the state would flirt with free-market activities at
the republic level while still holding true to socialist ideology nationally.121 This effort to reform
the economic and political system culminated in the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974. The 1974
Constitution, at the time one of the longest in the world with 406 articles, created a complex and
sometime contradictory system of power sharing between the federal executive position and that
of the nine republics and provinces.122 It weakened the federal system by allocating more
authority to the republics and provinces; as a result each newly formed republic unit inherited a
semi-autonomous status somewhat akin to that of a sovereign state.123 At the same time, the
provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo obtained a semi-federal status while still remaining under
the control of the Serb republic, a decisions made to appease members of the Serbian
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Communists leaders. The state of Yugoslavia, after the 1974 constitution, was run by the
consensus of the federal unites yet with the ultimate authority was retained by Tito. The 1974
Constitution created two presidencies; the lesser institution was a power-sharing branch divided
among the nine republics and provinces, each entity provided a delegate. The higher office, with
the real power, went to Titio who, under article 333, would hold the office for “an unlimited
term,” he was president for life.124 Finally, it allowed for self-determination through secession
but did not properly establishing the procedures of how to do so, or to what political entity
(province or individual level ethnic group) this right applied.
The fault in the 1974 Constitution is that it was centered on the monopoly of power
enjoyed solely by Marshal Josip Broz Tito. The idea of a life-term presidency was idyllic for
regional leaders who utilized populist regional nationalism as a tool for filling Tito’s void after
his death. The implementation of perestroika and glasnost by the Soviet regime, at the time
Yugoslavia’s leading foreign aid investor, meant the South Slav state endured economic
hardship, that allowed “nationalism [to be] the only conceivable remedy to communism in
Yugoslavia.”125 The state began an economically painful shift from communism to a mixed
socialist, free-market economy; backed by loans from international monetary groups.
The success of a post WWII Yugoslavia relied heavily on the charismatic leadership and
management style of Tito.126 After his death in 1980 the power shifted to regional demagogues
who “quickly discovered that beating the drum of ethnic nationalism was the surest way to
accumulate more personal power.127 Kosovo had been granted a semi-independent status under
Tito, but the province was still under the federal administration of Serbia. The strained
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relationship between the ethnic Albanians and Serbs living in Kosovo continued in the years
after Tito’s death. The Albanians wanting their own sovereign state, or at least more autonomy in
their affairs, struggled. Meanwhile the nationalist Serbs, who saw Kosovo as the birthplace of
their homeland and a birthright, did not want to cede the region to a “foreign” entity. The late
1970s and early 80s was witness to an “exodus” of Serbians and Montenegrins from the region
due to political unrest. In the late 1980s the situation resulted in protests by Albanians against
the Serbs, whose treatment of the Albanians was described as “apartheid.”128
Slobodan Milosevic, a rather unknown Serbian bureaucrat, used the crises to propel
himself to the leadership of the Serbian Communist Party as a hawk of nationalism. Milosevic
was elected Serbian Communist party Chief in May 1986. Under the Thirteenth Yugoslav Party
Congress held in July 1986 the Serbian delegation secured rights for Serbian majorities in
Kosovo at the expense of the Albanians. The delegation cemented themselves as the dominant
force in Yugoslav politics. Playing off of the situation in Kosovo, Milosevic utilized traditional
ICT of television and newspaper to propel himself and his faction to the head of the Serbian
party and making himself the “de facto sole ruler of Serbia.”129 Riots in face of rising Serbian
nationalism portrayed in traditional ICT as a flight from Albanian terror and oppression. Serb
nationalists responded to the Albanians with violence. Milosevic in 1987 gave a speech in
Kosovo Polje emboldening the Serb cause and to not give into Albanian pressure. The speech
was widely broadcasted over Serb media and resulted in an outpouring of Serb national pride.130
Kosovo would lose the semi-independent status it was guaranteed under the 1974 Constitution
and the leadership was replaced with Milosevic loyalists.
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Between 1988-1989 Milosevic consolidated his power through the use of the media and
by mounting an “anti-bureaucratic revolution” that saw purges of leaders not in his camp, who
were then replaced by loyalists.131 Milosevic continued his efforts of ethnic demagoguery in a
1989 speech celebrating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, the region which
nationalists claim is the birthplace of the Serbian state. The speech was filled with jingoistic
rhetoric and allusions to Serbs defending the gates of Europe from the Ottomans. It called for
unity among all Serbs living in Yugoslavia for the benefit of a greater Serbian ideal.132 In the
wake of the Kosovo’s loss of autonomy, the speech made clear Milosevic’s intentions; Milosevic
saw himself as the heir to Tito’s reign as president for life. The future of Yugoslavia would not
include egalitarianism among the republics and ethnic people, it would be a future dominated by
Milosevic’s agenda which was the building of Greater Serbia as the sole hegemon over the other
republics and provinces.
This was exacerbated by further abuse of Slovenes and Croats in 1990. The two republics
elected governments that promised to stand up to aggressive behavior from Milosevic. Faced
with a new crises in which the secession of Croatia and Slovenia was a possibility, Milosevic
refused to hold a referendum to review, and possibly change, the Yugoslav confederation.
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Despite the calls for reform, “Serbia remained an unreconstructed neo-communist dictatorship
that had adopted the forms of Serbian nationalism in order to relegitimate its decaying power in
the postcommunist era.”134
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Further economic failures, grandstanding by provincial politicians, and most notably
strong-man, nationalistic movements by the Serbian leadership to undermine the other Yugoslav
republics would ultimately seal the fate of the South Slave state. The system collapsed
completely in the Spring of 1991 when the yearly rotation of the office of the presidency was to
take place. The Constitution of 1974 established that each of the six republics and two
autonomous regions within Yugoslavia would select delegates who would rotate the presidency
depending on pre-established order of rotation.135 The system had worked well in the decade
since Tito’s death; however in the current climate of excessive nationalism, particularly that from
the Serb camp. The president in 1991 was a Serb named Borisav jovic, who was a close ally of
Milosevic. The next in line for the presidency was Stipe Mesic, a Croat. The vote for Mesic was
blocked by Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina which were under the control of Milsoevic’s
inner-circle. This Serbian coup of the highest office in the state resulted in Croatia and Slovenia
to announce their independence, thus the drums of war beat once again in the Balkans.
Milosevic had garnered control over the federal Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) and
reformed the national military into a unit loyal to him. In Summer of 1991 he used the JNA to
fight against Slovenia which had declared its independence. The JNA was also used to assist an
ethnic-Serb rebellion in secessionist Croatia. International recognition of both Slovenia and
Croatia in January of 1992 halted his efforts to include these states into his new Serb-dominated
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He then turned his eyes toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the
nine republics of the now former Yugoslavia. A Republic contested because of the ethnic
diversity, a Republic ostensibly designed by Tito to allow the Bosniaks a homeland.
The absence of a strong charismatic leader contributed to the 1991 fracturing of the state
into a complex and tragic civil war. From this several new states emerged. Including the
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Republic of Croatia (1991), Republic of Slovenia (1991), Republic of Macedonia (1991),
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992), and Serbia and Montenegro (also referred to as
Yugoslavia, 1992). The war was the largest military conflict in Europe since the Second World
War and saw tragedies and ethnic cleansing, the most extreme of which was focused on BiH and
which breakaway republic would control the region. After international involvement, the bloody
conflict was ended with the signing of the 1995 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Peace Accords or Dayton Agreement.
Analysis of Yugoslav History
The question, it appears from the history of Yugoslavia from the end of WWI to the
collapse of the state in the 1990s, is who would dominate the region? The period after WWI saw
a ‘great game’ between Croats and Serbs, accentuated by the separation of institutions and
political distrust. The post-WWII era was dominated by the strong, charismatic leadership of
Tito, a role that Milosevic sought for himself. The decades of dictatorship reveal that the
individual leader, the cult of personality, has a strong foundation in the former Yugoslavia. The
traditional sources of ICT in BiH were dominated by elites and worked for their agenda. The
focus of this thesis is not the top-down use of ICT, but the bottom up approach. It is a study of
everyday citizens using ICT that is not under the auspices of elites and possibly working to
reform the system at the grassroots level.
Impact of The Dayton Peace Accords
When reviewing the international community’s commitment to the Balkans it is
necessary to note that scholars find prejudice in historical attitudes directed toward the region.
Professor Bruce MacDonald, an authority on nationalism in Yugoslavia says the following on
Western predisposition toward the Balkans.
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In western Historiography Eastern Europe, particularly the Balkans has been portrayed in
a resoundingly negative fashion. The Balkans have traditionally been condemned as the
focus of passionate violence, blood feuds, despotic kings and communist dictators, and
subjugated women, welded together by primitive superstition. In many ways, the Balkans
as a quintessential “other” close to home has helped Western and Central Europe define
themselves against that which they are not.136

This “othering” of the Balkans stems largely from the cultural heritage of the region. This
part of Europe was under the religious influence of the Orthodox faith and had considerable
connections with the Islamic Ottoman world. As such, it was left out of the historical progression
claimed superior by Enlightenment-influenced Western Europe. Furthermore, its geographical
location has led itself to be conquered and colonized and thus unable to cement itself as power in
foreign relations.137 The economic stagnation, or lack or major economic power, is explained as
being a byproduct of this “cultural unlikeness” by those who find culture to be the prime mover
in moving the wheels of history. Samuel Huntington, in his text Clash of Civilization, view the
conflict in the Balkans as an example of natural strife at the fault lines of civilizations—a region
in the gray area between east and west.138
MacDonald notes the Western community operated under a three-tier system in
evaluating the conflict. The Catholics of Croatia and Slovenia were held in the highest regards as
they represented the greatest cultural likeness to the West. Second were the Orthodox Serbs who,
while still were inheritors of the Christian faith, were regarded as part of the alien Slavic east.
Finally, the Bosniak community was held as the most foreign of the belligerents.139 It is unclear
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if any of this Balkan-Orientalism directly influenced policy either in ending the war or in postwar relations. A survey of Richard Hollbrooke’s book on the peace process, To End a War
(1999), do not indicate that this orientalism played a part in negotiations; however it should be
noted that some of these tropes were present by policy leaders in analyzing the conflict.140 US
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberg asserted in 1995, “They have been killing each other with
a certain amount of glee for some time now,” Warren Christopher called it “ancient ethnic
antagonisms,” President Bill Clinton asserted, “until these folks get tired of killing each other,
bad thing will continue to happen.”141
The Dayton Peace Accords and the subsequent signing of the agreement in Paris of that
year brought the conflict in the Balkans to an end. Ending a war, however, is never an indication
that peace will be an easy transition. A Bosnian journalist discussing the legacy of the Dayton
Accords stated, “1. It brought the war to an end; 2….there is no 2.”142
The Dayton Agreement established that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to
exist as a sovereign independent state free of territorial claims by other states—notably Croatia
and Serbia and Montenegro. The agreement further established the framework for a functioning
democracy, including “free and fair elections,” and a constitution based on western principles
designed to “produce peaceful relations within a pluralist society” among other ideals.143 As
identity has been a factor in post-Dayton BiH (discussed at the actor level in Chapter 3) it is
important to investigate how ethnicity was handled by the international community brokering the
peace.

140

Hollbrooke, Richard, To End a War, (New York: Random House, 1999).
MacDonald, The Importance of Being European,” 251-252.
142
Mulalic, Nermin, From Daytonland to Bosnia: Rediviva, (Bosnia: Bosnian Institute, 1999), Forward.
143
Annex IV: Constitution, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, (US
Department of State, 21 Nov 1995), Preamble.
141

45

The agreement crafted by the peace brokers addressed specifically the issue of ethnicity,
often explicitly listing the three ethnic groups by name (though other terms such as national and
social origin are also used). The Constitution includes sections on protection of human rights,
civil rights and liberties, and even the protection of national monuments important to each ethnic
group. The Constitution states explicitly in several sections that all people of the state are to be
awarded citizenship and discrimination based on “national or social origin, association with a
national minority” is forbidden under the law.144
Annex II of the agreement establishes the “intern-entity” boundaries of the district. These
included the formation of its two main entities; the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina
(comprised of Croat and Bosniak), and The Republika Srpska (Serb). Although BiH was, under
the agreement, a unitary sovereign state these entities were awarded in the constitution a certain
level of autonomy. These include the right to “establish special parallel relationships with
neighboring states,” and enter into unitary agreements with these states (with approval by the
national Parliament).145
In relation to the central question of ethnicity and politics, Articles IV and V are of
critical importance as they address the structure of Legislative and Executive branches of BiH’s
government. Article IV establishes a Parliamentary Assembly with two chambers: the House of
Peoples and the House of Representatives. Quoting directly from the Article, the House of
Peoples “shall comprise 15 Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and
five Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republika Srpska (five Serbs).”146 Furthermore, “Nine
members of the House of Peoples shall comprise a quorum, provided that at least three Bosniac,
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three Croat, and three Serb Delegates are present.”147 The Constitutional language of the House
of Representatives omits specifically listing ethnic qualifiers, but proportional representation for
the Entities is included. Section III further delves into the nature of ethnicity and politics as it
provides at least three separate clauses that discuss ethnic group ability to block votes and it lists
the three groups by name.
Article V of the Constitution established the office of the Presidency. It states that the
Presidency is to consist of three members, held jointly by “one Bosniac and one Croat, each
directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the
territory of the Republika Srpska.”148 Each president can challenge legislation if they deem it to
be “be destructive of a vital interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was
elected.”149 The powers of the Presidency are fairly standard when compared to western states.
The only provision in which ethnicity comes into play is the appointment of ambassadors; no
more than two-thirds can come from the federation. As is evident, these two main Entities are
crafted around ethnic identity. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court is comprised of seven
judges, two from each entity and three international judges appointed but the European Court of
Human Rights.150 Several times in the constitution we see the importance of the Federation and
Republika Srpska in choosing delegates for assorted governmental posts. The two main Entities
crafted around ethnic identity and can even form “parallel relationships” with neighboring
foreign states (ostensibly this means the Republika Srpska can form closer ties with Serbia and
the Federation, likewise, with Croatia)—this has been the case in relation to passports (discussed
below).
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Based on this look at the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina we see that ethnic
identity is written explicitly into the governing document of the state and embedded directly into
the political framework of the country.

It is difficult to transcend identity politics when

representation in several branches of the government is dependent on it.
Why then was the Constitution crafted in this way? Would not this make for a state
unable to achieve consolidation? Did the aforementioned voices who felt this was a classic case
of people ‘killing each other for centuries’ play into the political framework of nation building?
With that said, international diplomacy is not crafted based on those sorts of principles. There are
precedents on forming a state with established ethnic fissures with the goal of alleviating
possible further devolution into war. Horowitz identifies these principles of power sharing as the
conflict reduction measure known as consociationalism.

Theories of consociationalism or conflict regulation diverge in several important respects
from the earlier maximalist theories. They are far more about modest goals. They assume
that it is necessary for ethnically divided states to live with ethnic cleavages rather than
wish them away. They argue that efforts to contain conflict must begin at the top.
Consequently, they assume that the agreement of group leaders is an important step
toward accommodation, especially because the habits, sentiments, and loyalties of
followers are difficult to alter in the short run…And, finally, unlike theories of national
integration, which emphasized informal social processes to the near-exclusion of formal
arrangements, theories of consociation and conflict regulation ten to accord considerable
weight to formal institutions, such as federalism or proportional representation. In all of
these ways, they are refreshingly realistic counterpoint to the earlier theories. If they fall
short, at least they are pointed in the right direction.151

Lijphart identifies the four characteristics found in consociational democracies as a
“grand coalition” of ethnic groups; equal veto power in decision making; proportional
representation in that one group does not gain an uncheckable majority; and federalism in the
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form of muted ethnic autonomy.152 This is precisely what is seen in the Constitution of BiH. The
goals of conscotiaionalists are described by Horowirz as “humble” in that they see their approach
does not provide a cure-all to mend cleavages, but it does provide a framework for workable
government in a political environment where fissures cannot easily be brought together
harmoniously.153 As such, it appears that the international and domestic framers of the BiH
constitution set out to create a postwar state with the checks and balances needed to function.
Indeed, the framers crafted a state that avoided the inter-ethnic entanglements of the inter-war
Yugoslavia and ensured that BiH have unified ministries, institutions, records, economic bodies,
public health systems, infrastructure and so forth.154
Rustow holds national unity, the vast majority of citizens with no doubt or mental
reservations as to which political community they belong to, as the only possible prerequisite for
a transition to democracy.155 Consocitational systems have two major components, “segmented
pluralism in social stratification and a concordant democracy.”156 Segmented pluralism is
focused on voluntary association along cleavage lines while concordant democracy depends on
segmented elites coming together in cooperation to reach agreements. Basch argues that if there
is any risk of ethnic separation in a country, all political institutions must be overtly pluralistic
for a democratic state to exist.157 In BiH the three groups have their own social and political
networks with hardly any crosscutting memberships, aside from professional environment.158
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The consociational style of government in BiH was crafted to avoid the continued hostilities by
allowing ethnic cleavages to associate among themselves while, at the same time, national unity
is preserved through the deal making and veto powers granted to the concordant executive.
This consociational system is not without its faults. As Horowitz states, the system is
designed to address realistic conditions on the ground by focusing on “modest goals” that are
“pointed in the right direction” of elite cooperation. It does however have the detrimental quality
of reinforcing cleavages at the expense of consolidation. Stefano Recchia, writing for EU
Institute for Security Studies, produced a concise table of setbacks created by the BiH
Constitution that is recreated below.
Table 2.1: Institutionalized Ethnicity in Dayton Bosnia
Institutionalized Ethnicity in Dayton Bosnia
Principles as
Ethnic Power
Sub-State
Foreseen by
Sharing
Autonomy
the Dayton
Constitution:
All legislative
Extremely
and executive
generous
authority shared ethnic selfbetween BiH’s
government at
three
the level of
‘constituent
Entities and
peoples’
cantons
Nationalistic
Sustained
Undesired
leaders in BiH
secessionist
effects
were often
tendencies,
unable to agree
particularly in
on major
the RS
reforms

Minority Veto

Proportionality

Each group has
extensive veto
power on matters
considered to be
in its ‘vital
interest’

Proportional
appointments on an
ethnic basis
throughout public
administration

Arbitrary
determination of
what constitutes a
‘vital’ interest
contributes to
frequent
decisional
deadlock

Clientelistic
relationships
between groupleaders and their
followers; increased
corruption

Source: Recchia, Beyond International Trusteeship, 12.

The table illustrates that the institutionalized ethnicity puts in place checks and balances
to protect one ethnic group from gaining hegemony over another. Representation is proportional
at all levels (legislative, executive, and judicial) thus each group has a voice in the direction of
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the state. This, however, can relegate the state to a situation of static gridlock in which sides are
unable to agree on reforms. It also perpetuates the importance of ethnicity over other factors
(economic, social policy) and it allows leaders to pander to inter-ethnic fears for political gain.
Bieber notes that at the end of the war there was no municipality in either entity where a
non-dominant ethnic group had a majority.159 This allowed for nationalist parties to entrench
themselves without the necessity of inter-ethnic compromise with a focus on other issues. The
failing economic system worked to exacerbate the inter-ethnic tensions because poor financial
outlook bread uncertainty.160 Bieber provides an overview of the main BiH political parties and
their level of nationalism.
Table 2.2: Political Party Nationalism in BiH
Designation
Bonsniak
Party
Extreme nationalist

Serb Party

Croat Party

SRS

HSP

Nationalist

SDA

SDS

HD

Moderate Nationalist

SBiH

SNSD, PDP

NHI

Non-Nationalist/Crossnational

SDP

Source: Bieber, Florian “Post-War Bosnia” (Hampshire: Macmillan, 2006), 33.

Bieber’s table indicates that the Serb and Croat parties have the most nationalistic
characteristics while the Bosniak parties, while espousing nationalistic qualities, are less
nationalistic when compared to the others.
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The European Union in BiH
An “inextricable net” of organizations, both NGO and IGO, are involved in the formation
of post-conflict BiH.161 The most prominent connected to the future of the state is likely the
European Union (EU). The European Union constitutes the largest economic bloc in the world
and its member states make up the second largest economic zone outside of the United States and
is of critical importance to the transition and future of BiH as a sovereign state. While the United
States played a prominent role in the NATO military effort to bring the war to an end in 1995, as
well as played diplomatic host and served as a chief negotiator in the Dayton Agreement, it is
clear that the future of BiH is dependent the internal politics of Europe. This is substantiated on
many levels; most notably the clear geographic interests and economic benefits of access to the
Euro and European Union markets. The European Union has a sharp eye toward the future of the
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2002 EU commissioner for external relations Chris Patten, stated, “[t]he
choice for us in this case is very clear: either we export stability to the Balkans, or the Balkans
export instability to us.162 It is, therefore, necessary to review the EU plans for crafting, or
directing, the future of the state.
The European Union decides on potential client states based on their “degree of
perceived fit within the EU community.”163 States wishing to join the EU are more likely to
reform to abide more closely with EU rules and preferences, therefore the strongest
“Europeanization” occurs with candidate states. Europeanization is described by Ladrech as “a
process or reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and
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economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy
making.”164 This description was later furthered by Radaelli to include “domestic discourse,
identities, political structures, and public policies.”165
According to the EU Institute of Security Studies, the majority of political elites in
Bosnia are desirous of future inclusion in the greater European community through candidate
status and membership in the EU.166 They are also aware of the “orientalism” projected onto the
region by Western European states. This has resulted in cultural arguments by political actors to
bolster their ethnic group as qualified partners in the western section of the concert of Europe.
The most notable examples come from the Serb and Croatian camps.
The Serbians presented themselves to the larger European community as the defenders of
Europe from the Islamic, Asian invaders from the east—clearly projecting the “other” status
applied to them to neighbors in the region. The traditional Serb orthodoxy in matters of
confession was downplayed and greater emphasis was put on their resistance to Muslim Ottoman
influence in the Middle Ages and early-Modern eras. The question of Bosniaks, and thus the
future of BiH as an independent state, were answered using the same arguments put forward in
the Tito era. The Bosniaks are merely “fallen Serbs” who converted to Islam under Ottoman rule
and thus they are but victims who belong to Serbia’s proud European tradition and can easily be
coopted into a Greater Serbia. Croats were regarded as unequal in both their claims for
sovereignty over BiH and for Croatia to join the EU. The Serb political elite presented Croats as
a people without institutions or history of self-government, only as a people who historically
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existed as a conquered power without the tradition or institutions necessarily to be full members
in the United States of Europe. These charges against the Croats are similar to the rationale used
in the first attempt at a Yugoslav state before WWII; a time when Serbs dominated both the
structure and agency of the state. 167
Croats, like Serbians, used matters of faith to promote their cause for acceptance in the
European community. The political leaders presented their traditional Catholicism as being a
prime example of their qualifications for inclusion. Croatian priests “excelled as patriots” for the
Croatian cause.168 Serbian Orthodoxy was presented as simply a regional, ethnic church not
belonging to the larger traditions of faith in Catholic Italy, France, and Spain. The claimed
appearance of the Virgin Mary in Medjugorje, Herzegovina on June 24, 1981 was promoted
widely to link the Croatian people and faith with similar instances in places like Portugal and
France. Our Lady of Medjugorje “became an enduring symbol of the cultural divide between
east and west.”169
The Croatian political elite distanced themselves from the Slavic community after
realizing it was not fashionable for future dealings with Western Europe. Croats saw “being part
of the Balkans means being part of the backwards part of Europe.”170 The Croatian delegations
too claimed ownership of the Bosniak community. Croatian academics claimed Bosnia
Herzegovina formed the “core of the old Croatian state and Bosniaks were simply Catholic
converted and used as Janissaries in the Ottoman army.171
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The Bosniaks are describe as the “least autonomous among the Yugoslav
denominations.”

172

Though there were some movements to promote a homogenous Bosniak

political movement, there were small and rather muted when compared to their Croatian and
Serb counterparts, as noted earlier. It was clear to the elite that their status and future depended
on good relations with the other ethnic entities in the area. As such, “religious pluralism and
tolerance” were viewed as fundamental in the new BiH state. 173
Both sides during war accused Bosniaks of wanting to wage holy war and set up an Islamic state
in Europe, this was to play to Western audiences as to proof to their own credentials of
modernity.174
When the dissolution of Yugoslavia began in 1991 the EU attempted to mitigate the
situation in order to avoid hostilities that could foment a civil war on the continent. Member
states, such as Germany, stated they were willing to formally recognize the breakaway states in
an effort to continue the effort of a peaceful end to the conflict, which was already heating up in
breakaway Slovenia. The EU Peace Conference chair devised a resolution known as the
“Carrington-Cutileiro Peace Plan” that called for Yugoslavia to be divided in a loose federal
system where states would be divided along ethnic majorities.175 This plan was summarily
rejected by both nationalist and non-nationalist political leaders as unfeasible and exacerbating
the already tenuous ethnic divisions. Each breakaway state, Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH, we
recognized by the EU by April of 1992.
When full civil war was clear the EU effort became part of the United Nations attempt to
end the hostility. Although EU member states made up the bulk force of UN (and eventually
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NATO) military detachments to the region, the EU appeared generally impotent in efforts to end
the violence. Peace proposals presented by EU negotiators were routinely rejected by the
belligerents, and continued efforts to divide the state among ethnic-majority federal districts in
exchange for peace were not accepted. Chiefly among the concerns for the Bosniak elite was that
the EU plans to form the consociational state left out a homeland for the Bosniak ethnic group.
The lack of military strength to end the conflict coupled with the inability to end the war
diplomatically showed the weakness of the European Union in mitigating issues on its own
continent.176
Following the peace the EU focused its strategy chiefly on border security issues as a
prerequisite for economic aid. This included a number of economic incentives and programs for
the region, the most important of which is the 1999 initiative known as the Stabilization and
Association Process (SAP). It is important to accentuate that these programs were formulated
with entire Western Balkan region in mind as the EU envisioned the creation of an economic
bloc so interconnected through the market that future disagreements could only reasonably be
rectified through diplomacy.177
These SAP economic benefits were marketed as an incentive to membership in the EU.
The program set “the framework of the relationship with the EU for the Western Balkans…all
the way to their future accession.”178 From 1996 to 2003 the EU financial assistance constituted
billions of Euros in reconstruction, trade, and investment. The EU was the single largest investor
into BiH.179 The stipulations for the investment was that the condition that BiH government
respect human rights and the democratic process.
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The EU has done work to resolve disputes in the region, such as agreements for borders
around the Port of Ploče.180 With that said, the EU focused chiefly not on domestic elections or
inter-ethnic cooperation, but on the issues of border security, visas, migration, and fighting
organized crime. This was handled through the SAP and the 2001 Community Assistance for
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program.
In regards to border security, which appears in the literature to be the issue of most
crucial importance, the focus of the EU was not on ensuring established BiH borders were not
violated by either Croatia or Serbia, but to ensure the movement of people from BiH into the EU
was done under established framework. The levels of Entity sovereignty granted under the BiH
Constitution culminated in a situation where Serbs in BiH are able to acquire Serbian passports
and Croats in BiH, likewise, passports from Croatia. Croatia was an EU candidate from 2003
until its recent succession as a full member in July of 2013. The Croatian passports allow
Croatian residents of BiH to have an easier access in getting Croatian visas and thus access to the
EU economic market.
This situation has made BiH a target for those seeking jobs in the EU and international
human trafficking rings. They acquired forged Croatian passports in BiH and thus matriculate
into Croatia and from there the rest of the EU. Under the CARDS program the EU initiated a
number of strategies in the region to contain immigration issues. Including an agreement with
Croatia in 2005 known as the “Support to and Coordination of Integrated Border Management
Strategies in the Western Balkans,” similar initiatives were presented to BiH and Serbia in
2008.181 The assorted Balkan states are individually encouraged to enter into immigration
agreements with other states.
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The reason for the focus on the movement of people as opposed to other issues is that the
EU is concerned with the migration issues through Croatia as Croatia is a conduit for human
trafficking. BiH comparatively liberal visa problem allows guest workers from Turkey and other
“high migratory risk” countries. They then are smuggled into Croatia.182 Though it should be
noted that from 2000-2005 the trafficking from BiH has dropped significantly, under the
indication from the EUs Stabilization and Association Agreement.
The EU’s differential treatment of Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of visa requirements
is a sensitive issue, as noted in the introduction of Chapter I. Bosnian Croats, have benefited
from the liberal EU visa policy towards Croatia as the majority of them have Croatian passports.
In contrast, the Serbian and Bosnian citizens require visas to travel into the EU and have
therefore been at a disadvantage because of their nationality. However Serbians in BiH can
acquire Serbian passports through a similar program. This has created a de facto dividing line in
Bosnia. The issue of visa-free travel became politically salient issue for EU-Western Balkan
relations. Visa liberalization was a catalyst for cooperation in the region among the Bosniaks,
Serbs, and Croats and they have worked together to achieve more travel opportunities.183
The EU goals to reform BiH democratic institutions has mixed results. In 2006 The
European Union decided to continue BiH on the process of integration even though many
benchmarks were reached. Indeed, it has been documented that political elites are not willing to
sacrifice long-term EU hopes if it means electoral defeat in the short term.184 Some notable
examples of EU failure to rectify the ethno-nationalist situation is the divided police forces in the
state. During the war it was the police and security forces responsible for much of the ethnic
cleansing that occurred. The Croat and Bosniak forces have merged but Republika Srpska has
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resisted attempts to unify their force into a unified national institution.185 The EU pushed the
Mostar Declaration which sought to reform the structure of ethnically divided police forces,
dubbing it Bosnia’s last chance if they sincerely want to join the EU.186 Though the Declaration
was signed in 2008 none of the reforms have been implemented. Similarly, public broadcasting
is still highly divided between the Federation and the Republika Srpska and exhibits ethnonationalist rhetoric. The two districts also have two separate processes for privatization market
entry.
In surveys of BiH politicians regarding the progress of the EU, the four most popular
responses show the elites found the EU to lack political muscle, were unclear, imploring, and
contradictory.187 These are not positive attributes to be associated with an agency trying to
reform a state divided along ethnic lines. The European Court on Human Rights ruled that BiH
was guilty of ethnic discrimination in the 2009 Sejdic-Finci case in which a Roma and Jewish
citizen were denied running for office because they did not meet the Constitutional ethnic
criteria. Noncompliance with the verdict could, theoretically cost BiH its seat on the Council of
Europe, a partner organization with the EU.188 This is a conundrum for BiH as the constitution
created by the international community explicitly states that BiH had no other choice but to deny
the two men a chance to run for office. Indeed, the very first peace plans proposed by the EU
called for a consociational federal structure.
The EU has not been an effective institution for democratization in Bosnia. The various
and seemingly overlapping economic plans and bureaucratic structures of the EU toward BiH are
likely necessary and perhaps the only available option to make progress, yet it is clear that in the
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decades after the end of the war the EU has been largely ineffective in transitioning BiH to a
liberal democracy that can fully integrate into status as a member state. Erlap identifies four
factors that make this evident. 1. The EU is not equipped to engage with a post-conflict state. 2.
The EU’s actions toward BiH are built upon moral superiority and self-righteousness. 3. As the
EU is made up of member states, there is no uniform policy among members. 4. Expansion
fatigue has caused the EU to push down the road dates for meeting benchmarks.189
Office of the High Representative
The Dayton Peace Agreement set up the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) that
oversees the implementation of the agreement. The PIC Steering Board consists of Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the Presidency of the European
Union,

The European Commission (the executive body of the European Union), and the

Organization of the Islamic Conference which is represented by Turkey. The Steering Board
appoints the Office of High Representative (OHR), a position developed in 1995. Initially the
powers of the OHR were relegated on observing and mentoring the political developments of the
state to ensure the protocols of the Dayton Agreement were being followed. After the 1996
election, however, the international community was concerned that nationalistic politics would
continue to segregate the society.190 It was then decided at the Bonn Conference to increase the
authority given to the OHR. According to the decisions made at Bonn, the Office has the
authority to make “binding decisions” regarding the time, location, and chairmanship of
institution meetings, impose decisions when elected leaders are deemed unable to do so, and
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remove from office officials deemed to be working in contradiction to the spirit of the Dayton
Agreement.191
Since its inception, five people have held the OHR office. Each High Representative has
used the Bonn powers in different frequencies and with different intentions to fulfill the Dayton
Peace Agreement. Since 1997 the OHR has used the Bonn powers more than 900 times,
including 191 “suspensions or removal from office” of officials; including both elected and
appointed.192 Notable instances of OHR insertion into BiH politics are the 2001 removal of the
Croatian member of the BiH presidency for promoting a separate Croatian Entity to determining
sales tax, a power delegated to the national government.193
The OHR has faced serious criticism. Detractors find the Office undermines the
democratic growth of the state and that it has contributed to low voter turnout and low
satisfaction with the government of the state.194 The Office is accountable only to the PIC and its
decisions are not open to appeal. It has been called the “European Raj” and is often considered
the true ruling office of the state, not that of the elected government.195
It has, however, been noted by others as a necessary feature of the state. Bosniak leaders,
for instance, see it as a welcome and needed check to the Serbian Entity elite in the Republika
Srpska. Erlap finds that the OHR is an “integral” part of the state that strengthens institutions and
keeps extremists nationalism from resurging, he finds the “long term stability” of BiH to be
dependent on the work of the OHR, without which would leave the state paralyzed and
regressing.196
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Citizen Desire to Mend Cleavages
The previous section establishes that ethnic identity is a deeply entrenched element in the
political structure of the state—evident the intentions of the international community that
provides oversight, the foundations of the constitution and the political posturing of the political
parties. Though the partners in this three-pronged ethnic conundrum have different goals (the
international community and the constitution are designed to ameliorate strife, while the political
parties are often antagonistic for their ends), it has created undesirable stagnation in
consolidation.

The responsibility of overcoming inter-ethnic division therefore is placed

considerably on the shoulders of regular citizens.
As Balkan scholar Stef Janses notes, “It was believed that the assimilating forces of
industrialization…would diminish, and finally erase ethnic cleavages.”197 With that taken into
consideration, achieving that goal is not an easy task, “The very existence of mass burial sites
cannot be suppressed, nor can its significance in everyday life of local communities.”198 The
scholarship reviewed reveals a varied outlook on the possibility of reconciliation. On one hand,
citizens remark that they want to transcend the divisiveness and move forward both nationally
and within their personal lives. One the other hand, however, there are considerable reservations,
anxiety and fear on whether this is possible—both in relation to the future of the BiH state and
among neighbors. Both the negative and positive positions are briefly examined below utilizing
accounts found in the reviewed scholarship. This is not intended as a definitive representation of
the feelings of Bosnian citizens, it is merely anecdotal, but is intended to capture a general mood
that exists in the state.
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Negative Outlook on Mending Ethnic Cleavages.
As noted above, the wounds of war are often the hardest to heal and it is no doubt further
exacerbated when nationalistic rhetoric is commonplace in the national political arena. The
experience of violence is, even almost two decades after Dayton,

is increasingly part of

individual memory and “public constructions of truth and history.”199 The scholarship finds that
war memory and distrust from the war is what drives people from forming relationships and
allows people to fall prey to hyper-nationalist rhetoric from political leaders. The fear of what
may come in the future drives people to shelter in a in the safe-space of their own ethnic
community and in some cases, look toward unification with neighboring states as to fully escape
potential future hostilities. Memory and uncertainty appears to be the culprit and from that,
nationalism and ethnocentrism remain the most prominent obstacles toward reconciliation. 200
An example to best accentuate this are the war crimes tribunals initiated to prosecute
those suspected of ethnic cleansing, rape, and other crimes during the war in Bosnia. The trials in
The Hague are viewed through a nationalist lens where Serbs feel the trials are a witch hunt
instigated by the international community and no proof that systematic, top-down persecution
existed.201 To further add to the disconnect, Bosniaks are least likely to demonstrate empathy for
the wartime experiences of others rely on feelings of victimhood and exploitation concerning
matters of inter-ethnic issues, conversely Serbs and Croats are far more likely to resort to
espousing nationalism.202 The future looks little better, especial among the Muslim population
living in the RS, as they have, despite the work of the international community and the OHR,
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“presumably few illusions of a rosy future and none at all regarding cooperation with the
Serbs.”203
Distrust is passed along through education—either personal experience or from societal
values delivered to them; people must be taught to see ethnic differences and favor or fear on
group over another. Mostar is the fifth largest city in BiH and was once a vibrant, diverse multiethnic community. In the years following the war the schools were largely segregated. The fears
of integration are positioned on the belief that there will be violence and prejudice against one
group or another. Parents blame politicians for maintaining and supporting segregated schools.
While neither group is openly hostile to each other, this anxiety prohibits their children from
making inter-ethnic contact at the neutral school setting. They feel powerless however to change
the divided landscape.204
Contact Hypothesis: Future of the State
American sociologist and religious scholar David Moberg notes, “Distrust increases with
strangeness, tolerance with familiarity. Cultural pluralism provides a framework for such
cooperation.”205 The concept that increased “contact among individuals from conflicted groups
could help distinction between group and individual and indirectly help the process of
reconciliation” is known as the Contact Hypothesis.206
Originally proposed as a method for improving relations in communities in the United
States that endured racism and segregation, the Contact Hypothesis has since been applied “for
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improving intergroup relations following large scale violent conflict.”207 The Contact Hypothesis
is postulated as one of the most productive ways to improve relations among inter-ethnic groups
that have experienced conflict.208 Contact among groups builds empathy and understanding of
the other from which individuals are more likely to cooperate or desire to reform systems,
(whether they be “law, custom or social atmosphere”), built upon separation of groups.209 The
theory identifies four elements needed to produce positive contact:
1. Equal Status between groups
2. Institutional support
3. Collaboration on shared goals of cooperation
4. Development of meaningful relationships between members of different groups.210
Of course, the nature of the contact is important. For the theory to be productive, the intergroup
contact must be positive in nature. The building of civil society in institutions like clubs, social
groups, and sports teams are all examples of positive interaction as members are equals and share
a shared interest and common goals outside of competition between cleavages. If people isolate
themselves from the societal other they are more likely to build, believe, and continue
stereotypes that maintain cleavages. The scholars searching for evidence that relations are
forming among different ethnic groups in BiH are cautious but optimistic, if not confident, in
their findings. The existence of intermarriage among groups in Yugoslavia during the reign of
Tito is a sign that inter-ethnic contact is not completely foreign to the people of BiH.211
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Unfortunately, a history of violence and negative stereotypes in the “20 years of intolerant and
divisive ethno-nationalist policies” have limited many of the the positive aspects garnered in the
Tito era.212
University of Macedonia professor of Political Science and International Relations,
Ioannis Armakolas, conducted a series of oral interviews with Bosnian Serbs over the 2007 time
period regarding identity and inter-ethnic relations. Dr. Armakolas revealed that people in
suburban Sarajevo who found work in the ethnically diverse city were at first apprehensive about
working alongside other groups; fearing that there would be strife. The results, however,
revealed that once in the work environment the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks were able to work
with each other to accomplish the shared goal. While it is unknown if solid and deep friendships
were formed, from this professional work relationship, “they transcended the boundaries erected
by the separatist political programs.”213
Similar findings were reported in the literature in relation to Bosniak views of Croats. In
the Herzegovina town of Stolac the Bosniaks viewed the Corats not as a monolithic force in
which all are acting in collusion for a common goal and all are accountable for the actions of
some. There exists a “counter-discourse” when discussing Croats, the narrative “shift[ed] away
from ethnic categories towards non-ethnic cultural and moral categories in order to” explain
relationships. Occupations and rural versus urban were descriptive characteristics to explain
behavior, not ethnic identity.
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public locations that ‘belonged’ to the other ethnic group, for example young Bosniaks would
frequent the Croat pub because it had a pool table while theirs did not. This contact can lead to
greater trust. Kolind notes that in Stolac, “Ethnicity and religion did not matter in many aspects
of everyday life.”215 This is interesting as” Stolac is divided on both political and administrative
levels, and there is only meagre interaction among members of different ethnic groups.
The piecemeal approach to inter-ethnic relationships is certainly not a cure-all that will
transform a fractured state overnight. It does however, start the foundations of communication,
trust, and viewing moving past ethnic rivalry or fear of dominance or retribution. New networks
of social relationships can be established to improve communities, and “with these new
relationships come trust.” 216
If the nexus between ethnic cleavages on the personal level and national level is a fear of
the future, what sort of future do the parties involved want? The four existing options are:
1. Devolution into their own, ethnic majority nation-states (any combination of an
independent Federation, RS, or Bosniak state)
2. Maintaining the status quo and work toward reconciliation.
3. Secession and annexation to neighboring states (i.e. Croatia and Serbia, proper).
4. Joining the European Union.
Any one of these proposals, would ostensibly solve the problem of fear of the other.
Numbers one and three are not mending the cleavage, but a complete divorce from the problem.
Number four would change the dynamic by including the people of BiH into the fruitful EU
economic zone. Citizens could then still maintain their ethnic identity but the certainty of the
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future could allow them make contact and increase trust and familiarity—nationalist leaders
would no longer need to rely on nationalism to frighten people into votes. With that said, there
are multiple and diverse polls addressing what future the people of BiH desire.
It appears from the polling that overwhelming opinion of citizens for the future of BiH is to
join the European Union. According to The National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs, when presented with all other options, almost 9 in 10 (86%) citizens supported accession
of BiH to the EU over all other options. The lowest level of support was in East RS, but the
proposal still garnered 59% of citizens.217 An the question of whether entities as the level of
government division should be abolished, 69% in the Federation agreed while only 9% in RS
thought it was good proposal. The notion of the state being dissolved and three, independent
states form did not garner over 10% support in any Entity (this idea did, however, receive 14%
approval in the Brcko District, an administrative region part of both Entities). Based on the NDI
findings, the citizens are frustrated with the current conditions. There is still an inter-ethnic trust
issue at hand when accounting for the question on whether Entities should be dissolved (large
support in the Federation versus almost none in RS). The only plan to have wide support is
accession into the EU.
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Gallup polling over the same 2010 period had slightly different

numbers but still, joining the EU enjoyed a wide and clear majority overall in the country and in
each Entity.219
A 2013 UN Poll on attitudes in BiH found that each group was proud of their ethnicity and
considered their ethnic identity important and believed their religious leaders were the most
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trustworthy. With that in consideration, dividing the territory in neighboring states received less
than 10% support across all ethnic lines. Dividing the country into three independent states
received less than 10% among all ethnic groups except Serbs who favored the proposal 22%.
Like the other polls, when asked if the EU was necessarily or preferable for the future of BiH,
each ethnic group agreed in majorities.
This does not mean that ethnicity is disregarded and replaced by a pan-Bosnia identity. The
issue of a singular, unique BiH identity, according to the UN survey results, is not very
important to the citizens of BiH. Instead, “ethnic and religious identities are the most important
aspects of identity. Even the regional/town identity is considered more important than BiH
identity. However, compared to Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats have a stronger BiH identity It
appears from the polls that while citizens of BiH are proud of their ethnicity.” However, the data
indicates they believe that EU membership is the most practical way of moving forward as a
nation’ “In general, the citizens believe that EU, USA, UN and OHR should have most influence
on the future of BiH.” . Of the other options, only dissolving the entities came close for Croats
and Bosniaks while Serbs preferred having some autonomy. Rural residents were more likely to
proud of their ethnicity and religion above other designations. Urban and rural have confidence
in the EU and support a future with it.220
The statistics match the analysis in the literature, “European integration has emerged as the
only tentative Bosnia-wide political consensus and cross-party and cross-ethnic commitment.”221
The idea of succession is not commonly thrown about by Croat and Serb political parties, likely
because the post-war idea is no longer obtainable but more so because this rhetoric will result in
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financial and electoral penalties from the international observers who maintain mandated power
of political institutions. Moreover, neither the Croatian or Serbian government advocate for
annexation or merging the BiH entities into their own states. 222
On the question “Do you think that in order for ethnic groups in BiH to reconcile their past
they should ...?” the most popular answers among all ethnic groups was to reach common truths
about the past and reconciliation.223 It seems that neither group want to abandon their identity,
the contrary, the statistics show they are proud of it. But the results show that a political solution
is sought that does not extinguish ethnic identity or extrapolate the cleavages.
Coupled with ethnic opinions, it is also necessary to review the opinions of different
demographics. College educated citizens education are less likely to prefer to live in an area
where their ethnic group is the majority and they have positive expectations about the future.
When asked the question of “I would like to have friends among people of difference
nationalities in this region,” a plurality across ethnic lines of those with higher than a high
education strongly or mostly agreed.224 Fractured ethnic relations were more of a problem for
urban than rural. While both urban and rural blame government and politicians for problems,
urban more likely to blame government rural likely to blame politicians. Youth (18-35) are more
likely to join a citizens action group and demonstrate.225 Youth in BiH were noted to be both
angry at the current political situation but were also more optimistic than other age brackets
about the future. Youth, while proud of their heritage, are less likely to identify solely with
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ethnic or religious identity.226 Finally, youth are slightly more likely to have faith in international
organizations such as the EU.
In regards to making interethnic connections and friends, A University of Colorado study
indicated that while over half of the residents of BiH (54%) have all or most of their friends from
their nationality, almost half (47%) of Bosnian adults want more friends from different
nationalities.227 Three of the strongest correlation with building interethnic friendships was a
better financial situation, urban versus rural, and more education.228 NDI data reveals the urban
residents are more likely to see ethnic divisions as a problem. The modernization theory, in
relation to ethnic tolerance, postulates that there is “greater tolerance by urban residents, by
younger people, persons living in ethnically-diverse republics and regions, and in those born of
mixed ethnic parentage.”229
Conclusion
The overarching point of the EU mission and its interest is to remove the need for future
humanitarian intervention in BiH and to prevent refugee and human trafficking flows into the
rest of Europe. With that said, the overall outcome of peace in BiH is of crucial importance as
this mission, if successful, would be a “victory for the EU as an institution and signal it is a fully
capable world body and validate the EU model of government demonstrating credibility of EU
foreign policy.”230
Although the Dayton Peace Agreement brought the violent conflict to an end, it also
burdened the new state with a governmental framework based on a federal system of two states
formulated on ethnic divisions and fraught with ethnic tension and inter-ethnic competition. Few
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consolidations are made for the betterment of the state as a whole and decisions are largely made
by elites bolstering their ethnic authenticity. For instance, the Serbian Delegation in the
Republika Srpska passed a referendum on independence from BiH based on the Kosovo vote for
independence from Serbia.
The scholarship does not indicate the foundation for the government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was not malicious in its intent. It was drafted to mitigate a very fragile and hostile
situation in order to work towards the goal of a unified state at a later date when the memories of
war were calmed. With that in mind, it is evident that the basic foundation for the state are
crafted along ethnic lines and therefore the political choices of citizens are relegated to ethnic
representation as the basic component of their own law. It is also clear that international actors,
while benevolent in their goals, have focused on issues such as border control at the expense of
other issues like mending ethnic fissures. There are few, if any, practical avenues for BiH to
work with the goal of forming a consolidated multi-ethnic state through the international
institutions or based on their own laws because the elites who crafted the government did not
allow that framework.
Therefore, an opportunity for a multi-ethnic nation working toward consolidation is the
political activism of the ordinary residents of the state. A grassroots effort is needed to reform
institutions from the bottom up to work around the ethnic roadblocks enforced upon them. The
next chapter focuses on the efforts of these grassroots actors in the area of political inter-ethnic
relations. It does so by looking at information technology as a tool for cooperation and reform.
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Chapter III: The Future of the State
The previous chapter established that the state is fractured at the constitutional and
political level, yet there are some openings among citizens to mend those cleavages and form
inter-ethnic cooperation and the grassroots level. This chapter reviews the nature of information
technology as a tool for mending the cleavages. It begins with a review of how Information and
Communication Technologies (ICT) can act as a tool for change. It then reviews actors’ use of
ICT in the decade after Dayton (1995-2005) and from 2005 to 2013.

ICT as a Tool for Change
The following chart illustrates how the use of ICT changes the dynamics in a situation of
disagreement. The chart was adapted by Reimann based on an earlier model of conflict
resolution by Kempf. It illustrates that a problem exists which in turn initiates a dispute between
parties. The use of ICT brings mediation into the equation where it may not have existed or been
feasible beforehand. ICT allows an exchange of opinions and, most importantly, an exchange of
knowledge where both parties learn the interests and intentions of the other. If it were not for a
channel of mutual discourse from other perspectives, actors would likely only receive a biased,
one-sided argument that is triangular in nature---they would hear exclusively a one sided story
and little progress would be made to rectify a situation and, at the same time, resentment and
frustration would remain. As Reimann notes, “ Mediation is possible only when interactions and
knowledge about intentions, etc. with both sides actively occurs… In Bosnia, often "multiple
perspectives" means "multi-ethnicity".”231
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Chart 3.1: ICT and Conflict Resolution

Source: Reimann, “Das Internet,” 9

The figure indicates that when there is a policy disputed among ethnic groups, each side
will advocate for their position. This position could be at the direct expense of the other group
(i.e. education funding, ID card reform). There is a decision made (action) and the outcome
rectifies the situation which could either benefit one party, both parties, or neither. The
introduction of ICT in the mediation process allows for the groups to participate and exchange
ideas with each other. This connection builds understanding with the position of the other side.
For instance, in the Babylution example, those in the RS who have access to state IDs may not be
aware of the problems arising from the lack of identification for newborns in the Federation.
Without the discourse taking place over the Internet, actors may not have a chance to hear the
other side. When there is two way communication, understanding, if not empathy, can be a
product. Thus those who would ignore the tribulations of an ethnic community with which they
have minimal contact could advocate for action the benefits all citizens; not one ethnic cleavage.
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For this exchange to be possible the Internet cannot simply be static websites that display
information in the same way a print advertisement would. People must be able to “tinker” with
it, to use it in a “generative” way where they can create content and interact with other users.232
This is known as Web 2.0; a change from the earlier Internet to a new mode dominated by chat,
email, social networking, and user created content—exchange, dialogue and participation.233
Moreover, for ICT to be a useful tool there must be equal access by all parties and an
even exchange of dialogue. This means that, for instance, the Internet must be free of blocking
and firewalls; have spaces where parties can ideas can be exchange in a safe, anonymous
environment; state and federal leaders must be reachable; and international partners (in the case
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the High Representative and European Union) should
also have emails and websites available.
Websites need to utilize web 2.0 to encourage the two way discourse necessary in the
model. Without it, it is just a one way discussion no different than traditional forms of
communication. Accordingly, there exists a worry that the largest threat to democratization in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is the “looming
government entities.

temptation of authoritarianism” from

When the elites control the political process without consultation or

discourse from citizens, policy decisions will be made that benefit the ruling elites: “At the heart
of the Bosnian governance problem…lies the lack of engagement by Bosnian citizens and
interest groups in the practice of government…Just as a company without the interest of an
owner will not use its assets wisely, public institutions which are not subject to constant pressure
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from citizens exerted through the democratic process will not respond to the needs of the public
effectively.”234
The following is a review of information technology in BiH in the decade after the end of
the war. It reviews the notable actors and institutions of the Diaspora Community, education,
government, civil society, the international community, and private citizens.
Transitioning State: A Decade after Dayton
A great deal has been written on the pitfalls of ICT to operate as a vector of change,
focused not just on government regulation (discussed below) but on basic access. This field of
research is known as the Digital Divide. It stresses that ICT can be a useful tool but basic
limitations on physical accessibility render it much less useful than its champions would hope.
Two of the biggest concerns are basic infrastructure, and accessibility (cost, having a device
available).
In the decade after the war the number of places where Bosnians could ‘get online’ was
relatively low. However in the years after the war both the British and Austrian governments
established libraries with Internet “access points” around the country. George Soros’ Open
Society Fund created a Mostar training center to provide access and teach people the skills to
navigate the web.235 International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also established
Internet youth centers in the state.236 One most fruitful methods to examine how many people
have access is to review the raw data of the number online. The following is a chart utilizing
World Bank data on the number of people online and the number who have computers in relation
to neighboring states.
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In terms of affordability, the cost of an Internet subscription in mid 2000s was “in
absolute terms a little below the German level, in relation to the average monthly income in the
Federation.”237 It was however still rather expensive and accounted for roughly 5% of monthly
income. The increase in Internet service providers did bring down costs by a few percent, but it
was still unaffordable for the elderly, unemployed, and students outside of schools, libraries, and
universities. 238 This is an important point as the Internet in the ten years after the peace process
was bottlenecked to those who could afford these costs or lived in an urban setting where
IGO/NGO Internet cafes and libraries were available.
Diaspora: A Decade After Dayton
It is estimated that nearly 1.4 million Bosnians live outside of the borders of BiH, this
accounts for roughly 38 percent of the global Bosnian population. The Bosnian Diaspora began
in earnest as a result of the war, with roughly 800,000 refugees, mostly Bosniaks, fleeing the
country in 1993-1994. 239 The largest recipient of the war-era migration were Croatia, Germany
and Serbia. The troubled economic history of BiH has contributed to continued migration. The
three aforementioned stated continued to be the main receptors of Bosnian immigrants in the
post-war era, but sizable populations did move, many time sunder guest worker programs, to
Australia, Austria, , Britain, Croatia, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA.240
The question is if, and to what ends, the diaspora population maintains contact with the home
country? Do connections and relationships exist and, if so, are these networks effective in
peacebuilding democratization in BiH? Bosnians who have sought asylum in other states
possible encounter a more consolidated democratic political system that is both economically
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and socially more desirable, these individuals can use their position to both lobby their new
home country for reform in BiH and, at the same time, serve as a conduit for news, information,
and opinions; indeed, studies have shown that diaspora networks can be vectors for positive
reform in home countries.241
The Bosnian Diaspora evolved in the Internet age, as opposed to historical examples, and
has been described as a ”digital diaspora” in the use of ICT in their efforts, this is beneficial to
the influence of organizations as the “Internet increase the range and quality of diasporas” in
both the new and old homeland.242 Throughout Europe and North America the diaspora
community, largely made up of Bosniaks, an inter-working organized networks of clubs and
organizations devoted to issues such as cultural awareness, assistance for communities in BiH,
assistance for refugees, communication with family and friends, and hold conferences. These
organizations’ goals are to educate and promote their issues and they rely heavily on the
Internet—utilizing chat forums, debate, emails and websites in the local and native languages.
The diaspora community is, “[n]ot fractured like previous diasporas where youth quickly
assimilate” therefore members of different age groups participate.243 In regards to direct action
and lobbying on BiH issues, the international community had regular contact with embassy
officials and direct contact with government and BiH political officials. Particularly notable is
the North American Congress of Bosniaks which seeks to amend the Dayton Accord
Constitution. Other notable examples include an online Jobs for Youth program in Italy,
extensive coordination between foreign investment in BiH and diaspora communities in Britain,
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and Swedish groups raising money to rebuild mosques.244 Gregory Kent notes that when the
opinions of the Bosnian Diaspora community are coupled with domestic pressure it adds greater
weight to the demands.245
Education: A Decade After Dayton
The education system in Bosnia is so highly segregated based on ethnicity, one activists
described it as “educational apartheid.”246 After the war, the Dayton Agreement did not address
the nature of primary and secondary education in the country (though the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe has monitored and provided advice as a member of the
international institutions overseeing the nation). This resulted in a fractured educational system
in which the content and tone of curriculum is biased toward the ethnic majority in that area. The
BBC reports that there are over 50 segregated school in Bosnia in which each ethnic group is
physically separated in their own classrooms. One student described it as "not good for our
future, but that's how it is…You can see that the different students don't communicate," she says.
Another noted "That will be a big problem for our country because we learn to be separated, if
we were together at school, we'd be able to understand and get to know each other…As it is, we
can't form our own opinions about others. We have to solve the school separation issue before
we can start to tackle other problems here."247

In this segregated system, the neighboring country is often the country of reference in
regards to history and social studies. This influences the curriculum in that there is no shared
academic BiH narrative, “in BiH it is claimed that the subject of history is being manipulated to
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create segregated identities.”248 The United Nations (UN) Declaration on Human Rights states
that all Children have the right to be educated in their own language; this was taken as
justification for parties to implement segregated education even though the Dayton Accord listed
the three languages as essentially the same but in different dialects. One scholar noted in a
review of curriculum found, “the most prominent finding of my research is the use of "us-them"
terminology in textbooks, in which hostile stereotypes about other national groups of the country
was typical…The Serb book, for instance, stated how the Serbian people were again forced to
defend their honor and dignity with weapons while the Bosnian version stated that "SerbianChetnik genocide against Muslims has deep roots.”249 In 2000 a law was passed forbidding the
import of text books from neighboring countries to try an halt this ethnically charged education;
however the same books were used but new covers and Bosnian authors were added.”250

Government: A Decade After Dayton
In 2004, ten years after the war, the government was slow to adapt to the Internet. The
international community stressed the unification of communication systems, however, this did
not come to pass. Each entity developed its own communication infrastructure that was separate
and not connected to the other entities. Entities put forth an emphasis on repairing and rebuilding
their own infrastructure but not on connecting it with neighboring entities. For example, in 1998
it was nearly impossible to make a phone call from Serbian Banja Luka to Croatian Mostar, the
Internet would be a “wonderful medium for overcoming these boundaries.”251 In the years
following the Internet did gain a foothold, but the information was largely not Web 2.0 and this
did not initiate discussion.
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In writing about the nature of Bosnian Internet in 2004, Turcilo finds it functioned as a
one-sided medium, more as a “bulletin board” for elites than a place for discourse—monologue
rather than dialogue.252 The main participants online were the international community, political
parties, and governmental bureaucracy. Turcilo notes that the 2004 landscape was utilized to
persuade not to discuss problems, off-line goals and rhetoric or governmental agencies and
parties were simply transferred online for self-promotion. 253 In the realm of outreach of political
structure and agency, the websites of parties were often “under construction” or listed outdated
or inactive email addresses—this meant that there were few Web-based,

two way

communications between constituents and the country’s leaders. Perhaps even more troubling is
that in 2002 several parties did not have websites (mostly those situated in the RS) and others
“barricaded themselves behind passwords” thus rendering them inaccessible to those seeking
information.254
Aside from these shortcomings the literature does not indicate that a concerted effort to
regulate the Internet came to pass in BiH. The elites largely ignored the Internet rather than
sought to control it. The focus of the elites was on traditional news sources and to maintain
ethnic based outlets established in the waning days of the war. The Dayton Accords included an
open and independent media establishment in their proposals but no solid plan was put forth to
accomplish this goal. When the Office of the High Representative (OHR) actively engaged in a
media reform campaign, there was considerable pushback by the ethnocentric political parties in
national elections. Likely as a result of this, the trust in the media by BiH citizens is low and, in
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the “10 years after Dayton, a failure to comply with professional standards and deliberate
manipulation of information are still common features of broadcast journalism in BiH.”255
Civil Society: A Decade After Dayton
Larry Diamond describes civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is open,
voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and
bound by a legal order or set of shared rules…it involves citizens acting collectively in a public
sphere.”256 Civil society consists or private citizens who form groups, organizations, or other
connections for a shared goal or interest. This can be either an NGO working to remove
landmines from a post-war nation, a trade union, fraternal organization, a sports club, or any
other private citizen group outside of the direct authority of a government. Civil society is
important for both the functioning and consolidation of a democratic state for the following six
reasons:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Protecting against the state’s encroachment on the private sphere and therefore
safeguarding a private and social space
Monitoring and controlling state power
Encouraging the democratic and participatory socialization of citizens and the
recruitment of democratic elites for the state’s decision-making bodies
Opening up channels for the development, aggregation and articulation of common
values and social interests outside the political parties and parliaments
Contributing to local democracy-building which in fledgling democracies often lags
behind democratic development at the national level.
Encouraging overlaps in the membership of civil society groups and organizations,
initiatives, and movements in order to help ameliorate or overcome entrenched lines of
conflict within society.257

For civil society, the main focus of this thesis is on the work of NGOs as, “NGOs are just one
of the pillars of civil society alongside citizen’s action groups, and independent media, and the
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critical public, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are it dominant component.”258 In BiH, the “law
provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right in
practice.”259 In the ten years after Dayton there was an estimated 8,000 NGOs listed as
humanitarian organizations alone, and another 30,000 addressing issues from the environment to
women’s rights.260 This illustrates that civil society has a definite presence in the country;
however its record for establishing solid democratic principles and inter-ethnic cooperation has
been “diverse and contradictory.”261
NGO groups in BiH that focus on political reform gained ground in the decade after Dayton,
in 2000 citizens groups exerted pressure to have non-government appoint delegates attend
council meetings in several cities across the county. This effort spearheaded the formation of the
Center for Civil Initiatives (CIC), and NGO dedicated to the monitoring of elections. In 2003 the
CIC had centers in ten municipalities across Bosnia-Herzegovina and partnered with twenty
eight other NGOs.262 Similarly, in 2003 agricultural NGOs united to protest environmental
policies that were viewed as a detriment to the nation’s farmers, the subsequent organized protest
“transcended ethno-political divisions” a rare occurrence in the state.263
Other NGOs are focused on peacebuilding and mending cleavages. A youth organization in
2000 produced brochures and held workshops on forming an inter-ethnic dialogue. Other
organizations worked with marginalized groups such as the disabled, gays and lesbians, veterans,
women, and national minorities (Roma and Jewish groups) to lobby for their concerns at regional
258
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levels. This was fruitful as due to the lobbying efforts of NGOs, public institutions in Tuzla
offered access and facilities to the disabled. 264
There were roadblocks in NGO efforts. According to Sejfija, a number of projects were
shelved or to followed to fruition because of ethno-politics; one group saw another as gaining an
advantage in a particular project (such as the construction of homes for veterans or democracy
training for youth, sports leagues) and the project was tabled. Of concern is that for many
projects, it is required that an ethnic balance of Croat, Serb and Bosniak be maintained—which
served as an excuse for blocking efforts. Civil society seen as “risky business for nationalist
elites, who fear it will jeopardize their control over the economy, the media and the general
public.”265 Other areas of concern revolve around securing funding which takes up a great deal of
time for NGO groups and thus subtracts from implementing programs.
International Community: A Decade After Dayton
In the ten years after the war, international organizations (IGOs and NGOs) had a much
larger presence online than did political parties and governmental bureaucracy. Over forty
“major international organizations operated in Bosnia in 2004, the majority of which had an
online presence in the country.266 Their online activity centered around their goal, or mission
statement: whether that would be mitigating potential social conflicts or strengthening their
company. The international organizations did a better job of interactivity and forming a dialogue
with citizens—while chatboards were not available, active email addresses were provided and
queries responded to.
Another example of online inter-ethnic activity is the children’s website project,
Kidopolis, an International Forum for Youth funded by UNESCO. Marketed to youth, users
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logged in and met others from around the world. Rooms had different themes all centered on the
Greek ideas of the polis and democracy. On this site the users did not describe themselves as
German, Serbs, or Bosnians or Croats, but as members of the Kidopolis community. Children
from different backgrounds socializing in a safe space is a first step to real world encounters,
which could be difficult in the real world.267 It appears Kidopolis had a special initiative for
youth in the Balkans as their page archive contains a flier for an “OnLive Tour” in July of
1999.268
The website for the OHR, the most powerful IGO in Bosnia, was not particularly
effective at conveying their message. The page included relevant news and speeches but the
information was entirely in English and the option for a translation to a native tongue was not
present. Moreover, the “contact” information was difficult to find so if a citizen wanted to ask a
question to the OHR, it would be difficult without a solid command of English and knowledge to
navigate the website.269
Conversely the website for the OSCE met criteria for both Web 2.0 access and
participation. The site, upon first entering, gave the viewer the option to select which language to
use, both Cyrillic and Latin scripts were available. While navigating the website the page stayed
in the same language setting. It also included a number of forums which users could contact the
OSCE and discuss matters among themselves. This allows for the needed participation, two-way
dialogue that makes ICT innovative.270
Citizens: A Decade After Dayton
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Citizen use in the decade after the war fell prey to the problems of the digital divide in
that elites were the ones most common to have access. This is due largely to the economic
situation as few could afford an electronic device through which to access the Internet and lacked
digital knowledge to navigate the World Wide Web. According to a 2003 United Nations
Development Fund report, most accessed the Internet at Internet Cafés or through workplace
computers, not at home.271
Citizen activity on the Net was generally utilitarian in nature. With that being said, early
Bosnian ‘netizens ‘had access to email, unrestricted websites, and chat. Bosnians used the
Internet for access to “semi-objective” information as the media had low trust among citizens.272
The chat logs reveal that most stayed away from controversial political topics, yet even
discussion of pop culture and other topics does build a foundation for the Contact Hypothesis.273
There was however some evidence of political discourse. In 2002 the City of Goražde
(Federation) maintained a webpage that had a forum in which Serb and Bosniak residents
discussed political issues. Though some insults were used, the discussions were generally
positive and possibly served as a “testing ground” for real life dialogue.”274 The anonymity of the
chatroom allows for this discourse in a safe environment.
As discussed, introducing the Internet in a transition state is not a clean and easy process.
It is, however, a solid stepping stone to greater access and usability. The early stages saw a onesided net with the interpersonal discourse and dialogue needed to make the ICT more than just
another source for the same filtered information. There were however points to consider as
hopeful. The international community establishing contact features, unrestricted access to foreign
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news services and chat features available to citizens. It was, even if limited, decentralized,
contained some aspects focused on the user, and had aspects of Web 2.0 participation.
Current ICT Proliferation: 2005-Present.
In the past decade the ICT usage and accessibility has grown throughout the world, this
holds true for the former Yugoslavia. The following are a series of charts to analyze ICT
penetration in BiH and neighboring states that were once parts of Yugoslavia. I include former
members of Yugoslavia as to show how the situation in BiH compares with its neighbors in the
region; a comparative approach yields better understanding of the situation at hand. The data is
from the International Telecommunications Union in conjunction with the World Bank.
The first chart provides information on households with a personal computer in 2010.
The computer being a traditional way to access the Internet and Web 2.0 software. BosniaHerzegovina, in relation to other neighboring states, lags behind in the percentage of households
with access to a computer in the home. BiH, which had 25% of the population with a home
computer, surpasses only Montenegro (2007 data latest available), which became an independent
state in 2006. Slovenia and Croatia are full members of the European Union, this it is not
surprising that the access to computers is nearly double BiH’s level. 275
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Chart 3.1: % Households with a Personal Computer: 2010

Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank.

Aside from having a computer in the home, there is the central question of how many
BiH citizens have access to the Internet. A home computer may not be routed to the Web or may
lack a wireless converter. There exists an increasing number of ways people can go online;
whether it be at work, a library, Internet café, cell phone, and so forth. The following chart lists
Internet users per 100 people from 1995 to 2012, when the data was last available. As is
indicated in the chart, out the former Yugoslav states, BiH ranks behind only Slovenia (70 per
100 people) in the number of people online. BiH’s total of 65 per 100 is slightly higher than
Croatia (63 per 100) and is well past Serbia and Montenegro who are at 57 and 48, respectively.
This data tells us that residents of BiH are increasingly active and familiar with using the
Internet. Over half the total of Internet users use it on a daily basis.276
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Chart 3.2: Internet Users (per 100 people) 1995-2012

Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank

Broadband Internet is a faster, more durable form of online connection. It utilizes
satellites and fiber-optic cables as opposed to the rudimentary dial-up modem method. This
variable is defined as “are the number of broadband Internet subscribers with a digital subscriber
line, cable modem, or other high-speed technology.”277 This type of ‘high speed’ Internet is more
conducive to surfing the web. As of 2012 BiH had a total of 11 per 100 people with access to
broadband. This was slightly better than Serbia and Montenegro but still well behind the EU
states of Croatia and Slovenia. 278
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Chart 3.3: Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers (per 100 people):1995-2012

Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank

As noted above, cost can be a detriment to accessing ICT technology. The following
chart lists broadband Internet subscriptions as a percentage of monthly GDP as an indicator of
affordability for the year 2009. As the chart shows, the affordability of a broadband Internet
subscription is in line with Croatia and Serbia and much cheaper than what is available in
Slovenia and Montenegro. This bodes favorably, from a standpoint of being on par with
neighboring states.
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Chart 3.4: Fixed Broadband Internet Monthly Subscriptions as % of Monthly GDP per
Capita: 2009

Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank

An Internet Server is the software and computer through which a person interacts to
connect to the Internet. Secure servers are servers using encryption technology in Internet
transactions.279 According to the Communications Regulatory Agency of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (CRA) there are 73 ISP companies in the state. The three largest of which, (HT
Mostar BH Telecom and Telekom Srpske, are partly owned by the government.
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The data

below on from the World Bank indicates that there are 99 secure ISP servers in BiH. Clearly the
data from the World Bank indicates more servers that what is listed by the CRA, as such, a
discrepancy in the data exists. This can possibly be explained by the nature of ICT technology,
individuals can create servers through their own computer systems or through proxies if they
have the knowledge. With that said, the number of servers is still low in BiH, beating only
Montenegro. Population differences could account for some of the discrepancy in relation to
Croatia and Serbia, as this is a total number and not a per capita measurement.
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Chart 3.5: Secure Internet Servers: 1995-2012

Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank

Another increasingly popular method of accessing the Internet is the use of cellular
phones. Cell phone usage for Internet access is increasingly common in states that are new to
ICT because it operates through the use of satellites and not infrastructure. The cell phone usage
per 100 people in BiH is the lowest in the area but, it stands that 89.5 out of 100 people have a
cellular phone. Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro have 113, 110, and 177 cell phones per 100
people respectively—indicating that it is not uncommon for people to have more than one phone
or likely multiple per family under one subscription. According to the CRA, there are 3.5
million cellular telephone subscriptions in a country of 3.8 million people; moreover, 70% of the
country is covered by 3G/4G mobile Internet access. 281
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Chart 3.6: Mobile Cellular Subscriptions (per 100 people): 1995-2012

250

BiH

200

Croatia
Slovenia

150

Serbia
Montenegro

100

50

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

0

Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank

The domain name for BiH websites is “.ba.” A domain tells through what agency a
website is administered ( for example, .gov is a governmental domain name in the United States).
The establishment of domains is another factor in Internet proliferation as it indicates there is
growth among people who are going online. The BiH domains are administered by the
University Telinformatic Centre. The chart below illustrates that the Internet is steadily growing
in BiH, with 2,750 unique Internet domains established in 2013 alone. The largest upswing in
domain registration happened after 2005.
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Chart 3.7: .ba Domains per Year: 1995-2013

Source: “.bh Internet Domains.” University Telinformatic Centre, accessed March 2014. Available at
(http://nic.ba/lat/menu/statistics)

Compared to Serbia, the only other neighboring state for which data was available, we
see that BiH is well behind in the number of total unique domains up to first months of
2014. However population size could account for the discrepancy as Serbia has nearly
double the population as BiH.
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Chart 3.8: .ba (BiH) and .rs (Serbia) Domains Established in 2014
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Source: “.bh Internet Domains.” University Telinformatic Centre, accessed March 2014. Available at
(http://nic.ba/lat/menu/statistics). “Events Calendar.” Register of National Internet Domain Names of
Serbia. Accessed March, 2014. Available at (http://www.rnids.rs/en/).

As indicated in the chart above, though it is not a leader in ICT among its neighboring
states, there is established access to the Internet for residents of BiH. The literature doesn’t
indicate a threshold for when computer or Internet proliferation is substantial enough to initiate
reform, the numbers indicate its presence is worthy of examination. Nearly 34 per 100
households have a computer, 65 per 100 use the Internet, 89 per 100 own a cell phone, and its
cost is relative to states in the area. The question is then, what do people in BiH do when they go
online? To analyze this I use Alexa.com’s statistics on the top twenty-five most visited webpages
in BiH.
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Though there are several sites that provide online analytics, Alexa.com is established in
literature of Bosnia and the Internet.282 I list the site domain name, a description of the site, the
majority education level of users (the largest majority listed), and the access location. I provide
this only for sites in which BiH and other surrounding states were the majority users. This was to
leave out data that was not overwhelmingly from the Balkans. Alexa lists the data for all users
and sites that were globally popular. Analytics for sites such as social media site Facebook would
not provide a clear picture of how the site is use in BiH, but would give a general overview for
all users. For sites that were popular in Bosnia but majority used in Serbia or Croatia, I include
the data as I believe similar people in the region access these sites in a similar way. Below is a
list of the top ten sites and a description on what the sites are.
Table 3.1: Popular Websites in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Rank Site

Description

1

Facebook.com

2

Google.ba

3

Youtube.com

4

Google.com

5

Pik.ba

6

Klix.ba

Online social networking
site
Search engine as well as
other Internet related
services
User driven video
sharing website
Search engine as well as
other Internet related
services
Online auction and
shopping
News

7

Neobux.com

8
9

Avaz.ba
Wikipedia.org

“Paid to click”
ad/marketing
News
User generated online

282

Education level
of users
X

Access Location
X

Some College

School

X

X

X

X

No college/Some School
college
No
School
college/Some
college
No college
School
Some college
X

Home
X
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Approach.” Journal of Information Technology and Politics Vol 9 (2012), 191.
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10
11

Blogspot.com
Yahoo.com

12
13

Ask.com
Live.com

14
15
16

rezultati.com
akamaihd.net
Index.hr

encyclopedia
Web blog publishing
Search engine as well as
other Internet related
services
Search engine
Microsoft services and
software
Sports News
Pop up ads.
News

17
18
19
20

blic.rs
sportsport.ba
ask.fm
radiosarajevo.ba

News
Sports News
Social networking
News/Streaming Radio

21
22
23
24

kurir-info.rs
bhtelecom.ba
24sata.hr
biscani.net

News
Telecom Company
News
News

25

dnevnik.hr

News

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Some college
X
No
college/Some
college
Some College
College
X
No
college/College
Some college
No College
No College
No
college/Come
College
College

Home
X
Home/School

School
Home
X
Home
Home
Home
School
Home

School

Source: “Top Sites in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Alexa: The Web Information Company. Accessed March 2014.
Available at (http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/BA).

The table indicates that the most popular websites are news (including sporting news) as
this classification accounts for eleven of the top twenty five websites. News sites have bolded
text. Web 2.0 sites (user generated interactive sites) account for nine of the top twenty five.
While not “user generated” in themselves, an Open Source Society study finds that many of
these news sites include forums and a comment section.283 I include Google and Yahoo in the
Web 2.0 classification because, while they are primarily search engines, they do provide social
networking and other interactive features such as email, chat, Yahoo Answers and Google+. I
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also include Pik.ba as it is a user-driven market place that would encourage inter-ethnic
economic transactions which would, like adding a friend on Facebook, ostensibly initiate contact
between two people. I also include Wikipedia in this designation as it is user generated and each
page includes a “talk” section where users can discuss the article anonymously. Web 2.0 sites are
highlighted in gray.
As social networks cast a wide net and are often global in their scope, I was not able to
capture reliable data on who in BiH accesses these sites and where. The news, being local in
content, had reliable data. The information from Alexa.com indicates that most visitors to these
sites have at least some college experience. They are mixed between accessing at home and
through school facilities. This would indicate that those who access the Internet are higher
educated and the youth, who access the Internet from schools and universities.

The data

indicates that people still identify with established ethnic designations. With that said, again,
citizens generally see the EU as the future of the state and college educated and urban are more
likely to want to mend cleavages. It appears from the Alexa data that college educated and youth
are accessing the top 25 websites in the state.
These assumptions are supported by the Open Society Fun which finds that, “Internet
activity is still heavily concentrated within younger age groups and the urban population…65%
of people in the urban population owned a computer compared to 40% in rural areas.”284 Youth
in Bosnia access the Internet almost daily use the service as their basic source of news and
information. Furthermore, 75% of Bosnians between 15-24 use the Internet and of that 80% are
students. More than three-quarters of the BiH Internet audience are between 10 and 75 years of
age use the Internet every day. With that age range noted, the 15-24 bracket accounts for 93% of
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all frequent Internet users.285 This point is furthered by Turcilo in a 2010 study that showed The
Internet in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still a media of younger, urban elite…mainly situated in cities
and with at least high school education.286

Based on this data, it is clear that the use of ICT, especially the Internet is near
monopolized by the youth of Bosnia, making this demographic group particularly important for
this study. The previous statistics from the UN, and University of Colorado focused primarily on
attitudes among ethnic groups and touched briefly on non-ethnic demographics. Based on the
knowledge of the age bracket that uses the Internet, it is necessary to revisit some of the
questions in the survey with a focus on this group. The following is a selection of questions taken
from the 2013 UN report, listing a synopsis of questions asked and the percentage who agreed
with the statement. The UN data also shows that college education and urban v. rural are
important factors in attitudes, but I find it more beneficial to focus on the youth demographic as
the youth can encompass both the educational and geographic criteria.
Public Opinion Poll Results for Youth (18-30/5)
Table 3.2a: Satisfaction, Confidence, and Blame
Question
How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?
(Percentage for “dissatisfied”)
Who do you hold most accountable for those problems? (Percentage
for “government”)
Who do you hold most accountable for those problems? (Percentage
for “politicians”)
How much confidence do you have in... ? (percentage for political
parties)

Percentage (Age 1830/5)287
48%
78 %
83%
13%
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The data collected is for youth between 18-35, some questions are listed as 18-30. Though not a perfect fit with
the 93% frequent Internet users listed above, I believe the age range is not so far off as to miss the weltanschauung
of youth in BiH.
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How much confidence do you have in... ? (percentage for council of
ministers)
How much confidence do you have in... ? (percentage for cantonal
government)
How much confidence do you have in... ? (percentage for entity
government)
In your opinion, what are the biggest
problems and challenges in the country at present? (percentage for
“corruption”)
In your opinion, what are the biggest
problems and challenges in the country at present? (percentage for
“economy”).

16%
20%
22%
67%

56%

Source: Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report ,” United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2013), pg 159. Available at (http://www.un.ba/upload/documents/Prism%20Research%20for%20UN%20RCO_Statistical%20report.pdf

The poll results above indicate that the youth hold economic issues and corruption as the
most pressing concerns in the state—not antipathy to other ethnic groups.

The economic

difficulties in BiH have caused high unemployment rates among youth and increase the desire to
leave the state altogether in search of a better financial future. The blame for these problems is
placed on the government and politicians at all levels, from national to the cantons.

The

dissatisfaction reveals a disdain for the status quo of inter-ethnic rivalries to amass power. The
data indicates the youth see their needs as being ignored by those in office.

Table 3.2b: Ethnic Identity
Question
How proud are you of ...? (percentage for “Proud of ethnicity”).
How proud are you of ...? (percentage for “Proud being a citizen of
BiH).
How proud are you of ...? (percentage for “Proud of religion”)

Percentage (Age 1830/5)
88%
73%
90%

Source: Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report ,” United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2013), pg 159. Available at (http://www.un.ba/upload/documents/Prism%20Research%20for%20UN%20RCO_Statistical%20report.pdf

Table 3.2b illustrates that youth in BiH are proud of their ethnicity with a clear majority
answering in the affirmative. They are also proud of their religion, which in the case of BiH is an
important variable in identity; with Croats identifying as Catholic, Bosniaks as Muslims, and
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Serbs with the Orthodox faith. At the same time, they are proud to be citizens of BiH, to a lesser
degree than their pride in ethnicity and religion but still with a clear majority at almost 75%.

Table 3.2c: Views on Future of the State
Question
To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?
(Percentage for “voting”)
To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?
(Percentage for “Would join a citizen’s action group”)
To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?
(Percentage for “Would take action such as demonstrating”)
To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?
(Percentage for “join a political party”)
To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?
(Percentage for “use violence or force if it becomes necessary”)
To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?
(Percentage for “leave BiH”)
Do you believe that further deterioration of the situation in BiH could lead to
new violence in BiH?
Keeping in mind your ethnic group, would you defend the integrity of BiH?
(percentage answering “use all peaceful means”)
Keeping in mind your ethnic group, would you defend you ethnic/national
territory? (percentage answering “use all peaceful means”)
Irrespective of what you think is realistic or not, in what kind of a country
would you most wish to live in? (percentage for “BiH within its current borders
and entities.” This 25% was the highest percentage for 18-35 demographic
among all options)
Which of the following countries and organizations should have most influence
on the future of BiH? (Percentage answering “EU”)
In your opinion, what are the three most important priorities of the
International Community in BiH? (percentage answering “economic and
business development” as the most important priority).

Percentage
(Age 18-30/5)
51%
21%
30%
21%
8%
49%
53%
47%
53%
25%

67%
87%

Source: Public Opinion Poll Results: Analytical Report ,” United Nations Resident Coordinator Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (2013), pg 159. Available at (http://www.un.ba/upload/documents/Prism%20Research%20for%20UN%20RCO_Statistical%20report.pdf

The first four questions listed in Table 3.2c indicate a slim majority of youth are willing to
vote in elections and less than a quarter would participate in the political process by other
means—though 30% did indicate they are willing to demonstrate. The lack of enthusiasm for
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participating in the political process is problematic for youth in BiH who are, according to Table
3.2a, frustrated with the current political climate in the state. Moreover, Table 3.2b shows that
youth are proud of their identity. With those principles established, less than 10% indicate they
would participate in violence, though a majority fears that further deterioration of the state could
lead to a renewal of violence. Considering the frustration at the economic climate and political
leadership, the youth do not wish to dissolve the state and have their Entities become
independent or join neighboring states. The 25% response for “BiH within its current borders
and entities” appears small, but it was the most selected response in the poll. The choice of a
separate Bosniak entity received 12% and a separate RS garnered 15%, which was the second
highest response in the poll. The responses of “other” and “no answer” each received 12%. No
other responses were above 7%.

Therefore, of those responding, the consensus is that

dissolving the state is not sought after by youth in BiH. The youth indicate the European Union
should have the most influence over the future of the state, and that influence should be based
upon economic development. Based on the three charts of NDI data, youth are proud of their
ethnicity (and with that the variable of faith), yet they are not hyper-nationalistic in that they
want to break the state up or place blame for their problems on the ‘other.’ They are frustrated
by the current consociational government and political cultural and have little faith in the
political elites’ ability to solve the problems of the state. they want economic reform and they
want it to involve the European Union. They are willing to vote and at a lesser level join civil
society institutions, and demonstrate to voice their concerns.
This is a demographic that has few memories of the war and thus do not directly carry the
scars of the conflict. The fact that their stated main focus is the economy and not inter-ethnic
fears possibly indicates that the youth of BiH are willing to mend ethnic fissures, indeed the
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literature indicates they have a greater preference for inter-ethnic friendships.288 As stated earlier
in the chapter, those who have access to the Internet tend to be higher educated and urban.
Education and urban living were shown to be positively correlated with pluralism and interethnic friendship. The youth dominate Internet usage, and Internet users are more likely to be
urban and higher educated, therefore, it is likely that the youth activity online is encompasses
inter-ethnic cooperation to lobby for reform.
The next section explores the usages of ICT to mend cleavages and initiate activism on
governmental reform. It reviews the institutions discussed earlier in this chapter but the time
period is from 2005 to present. The goal is to discover if the literature points to ICT usage to
solve problems in the state.
Education: 2005 to Present
As previously discussed, education in Bosnia is often fragmented along ethnic lines,
whether through outright segregation or methods such as text book selection. A fractured
education system likely leads to a continuation or prejudice and mistrust as students do not have
the contact to build positive relationships. With that said, the scholarship indicates the Internet is
being used in Bosnia as a tool to overcome these hurdles.
The implementation of ICT and social networking is already used in Bosnia in legal
training and to a degree in further education in the medical fields, but also in general education
as well; most notable of which are integrated computer sciences courses online.289 The use of
interactive (Web 2.0) tools and social media sites changes the way students communicate within
and outside of school, “these applications are emerging with educational potential thanks to
unique opportunities of Web 2.0 for improvement of teaching tools in practice, collaboration,
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communication, individual expression, and literacy. “290 The Internet in Bosnia is most used by
the younger generation, between 15-24 years of age. Moreover, 84% of students and pupils have
used Internet at least once. It is used “mostly for communication (25%) and for educational
purposes (24%), slightly less for entertainment purposes (21%), it was shown that 93% of
student respondents have a Facebook account, and 66% of them visit Social networks, Wiki and
live chat forums were the most popular.”291
Bosnia’s eight public universities have initiated an effort to utilize social media sites,
specifically Facebook, in their curriculum. This is a fruitful step as nearly 93% of those in school
have an account with the site. The use of information technology in forming curriculum allows.
This allows students to communicate with individuals they may have little contact with if schools
are segregated. Moreover, it has allow students to “changing the way they communicate
within and outside of school.292
Another approach toward pluralism in the classroom is the use of ICT resources by
teaching staff. Educators may be limited to the instructional resources on hand—as noted, these
resources may carry a bias not conducive to multi-ethnic perspectives. In a research study on the
use of ICT in Bosnian classrooms it was found that teachers trained in ICT were more likely to
incorporate their findings in classroom material, “When knowledge, attitudes, and hours of
Internet use increased, the level of ICT usage for learning and teaching purposes increased as
well.”293 The increased training of teachers allows more opportunities for inter-ethnic
understanding and exchange of ideas and knowledge.
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Another example of ICT use in education is through the libraries of the country. In 2010
the library in the Federation town of Zavidovići initiated a series of ICT related education
programs for high school students. The young people were commuters who were spending up to
four hours a week waiting on the bus. The library “created a multimedia center with modern
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to encourage them to come into the
library.”294 The ICT center, named the Youth Corner, attracted over 190 youth a week. At the
library they learned computer, Internet, and media skills as well as using social media websites
such as Facebook and YouTube. The library also offered courses in English, digital photography,
journalism, and audio and video production. The youth made videos and photograph of their
town and posted them to social media sites, which attracted several thousand views including
many of the diaspora community who were from the area. 295
The organization Knowledge Without Boundaries (EIFL) does extensive work with
libraries to promote education in developing and transitioning countries “to contribute to
sustainable economic and social development.”296 EIFL seeks to bridge the digital divide by
training librarians to use ICT resources and making software, hardware, and digital reference
material available.297 Library patrons in BiH through EIFL programs gained access to scholarly
journals, art, music, and other information that would not be available with resources at hand, in
this way libraries can bridge the gap left by schools that are ethnocentric in attendance or via

294

Knowledge without Boundaries (EIFL), “Youth Corner and Media Training Center: Zavidovici Public Library”
(2011, March), 2. Available at (www.eifl.net/system/files/201104/case_study_bosnia.pdf).
295
Knowledge without Boundaries ,“Youth Corner and Media,” 5.
296
Knowledge without Boundaries, “Mission”. Accessed February, 2014. Available at (http://www.eifl.net/who-weare#mission).
297
Knowledge without Boundaries “EIFL-FOSS Looks Back at Four Years of Achievement,” Accessed February of
2014. Available at (http://www.eifl.net/news/eifl-foss-looks-back-four-years-achievements).

105

curriculum. There are 85 libraries in BiH that are part of the EIFL consortium; these include
university libraries, local public libraries, archives, and NGO libraries.298
Education reform is a crucial element to the future democratization in the state as those
educated in a pluralistic society are less likely to hold prejudicial ideals. ICT use in the
classroom and through public services is a hopeful sign, but it likely has too small of an impact
at this time to initiate much measurable change.
Civil Society: 2005 to Present
As noted above, NGOs are the most “dominant component” of civil society in BosniaHerzegovina. Though many have offices around the country, utilizing information technology
would allow for a broader reach to the public. The chart below lists twelve active domestic
NGOs in the state. The chart lists the name and focus of the NGO followed by an assessment of
their Internet footprint. The goal is to see if the NGOs are actively engaging Bosnians online and
if there are opportunities for Web 2.0 cross-communication or discourse that would indicate
potential according to the Reimann ICT conflict resolution chart.
The table below provides names of NGOs and a brief description of their focus. Included
is whether the organization has a working website and what written languages used. As language
is a controversial subject in BiH, I list only the script; Latin based as used by the Croat and
Bosniak community and Cyrillic by the Serbian community. If neither the domestic language is
present, but the site is in English, I list English in the column. The news variable indicates
whether the site has up to date information on what the organization is doing. Contact is whether
the website provides an easy to find email contact. Web 2.0 indicates if the site has a forum or
message board for users. The last three indicators, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, are popular
298
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social media, user generated Web 2.0 websites. I included a check mark if the site links directly
to their account on these sites.
Table 3.2: NGOs Operating in BiH
Name of NGO

Focus

Website

Script

News

Contact

Centre for Civic
Initiatives
Centre for Free
Access to
Information
Centre for
Peace and
Multiethnic
Cooperation
International
Forum Bosnia
Media Plan
Institute
Napredak Croat
Cultural Society
Open Society
Fund
Research and
Documentation
Centre
Sarajevo
Transparency
International
BiH
Youth Network
of BiH

Democracy and
Civil Society
Freedom of
Information



Cyrillic/Latin





English

Inter-ethnic
cooperation



Inter-ethnic
cooperation
Media
research/Education
Promote Croatian
Cultural traditions
Democracy/Civil
Society
Genocide/War
Crimes
Investigation

Community
boost_r

Facebook

Twitter

YouTube



Web
2.0
X



X







X

X

X

X

Latin

X



X

X

X

X



Latin

X



X

X

X

X



Latin





X

X

X

X



Latin





X

X

X

X



Latin





X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Anti-corruption



English





X

X

X

X

Cooperation
between Youth
Organizations in
BiH
Promote
technology for civil
participation and
transparency



Multiple





X



X

X



Latin/Cyrillic













Source: Organization Websites. Listed in Index.

As the chart indicates, nearly all have news and contact information, but only three had
any interactive, Web 2.0 capabilities. The lack of interactivity and discourse means that Bosnians
are less able to communicate with the NGOs operating in their state. There is not a digital
exchange. It also means that they may be less likely to engage and work with them as their
presence is not ‘on the digital radar’ for young Bosnians who use the Internet and indicate they
would join, at a 21% rate, a civil action group. NGOs need to do a better job of making their
organizations visible and interactive online. The following is a review of the online activity of
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the two groups who include Web 2.0 capabilities on their websites: Centre for Civic Initiatives
(CCI), and Community boost_r.
The CCI is a local, non-governmental, non-profit organization that works in both entities
of BiH. Its missions is to “promote active citizen participation in the democratic process and to
strengthen the capacities of organizations and citizens to solve community problems in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.”299 Its long term goals include strengthening the NGO sector, increasing
transparency in government, and increasing citizen participation in the democratic process. The
CCI has a long list of accomplishments, including changed the Federation Constitution to allow
direct voting for municipal mayors, improved governmental transparency in 47 municipalities,
implementing elections of school principals in Tuzla and Kalesija, an the adoption of the Law on
Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of Disabled.300
The online presence of CCI is very extensive. The organization maintains a Facebook
page with over 5,000 followers and it is updated several times a week. Their YouTube account
contains several hundred videos however they have very few subscribers and videos rarely reach
more than 200 views. Their e-newsletter is published on their website every three months. Alexa
does not provide much data on their website as its global rank is too low; however it does show
that popular Bosnian websites (such as blogger.ba and klix.ba) link to them extensively.301 CCI
used ICT extensively in the run up to the October 2010 election, which was described as “the
first elections where civic organizations have played a significant role in terms of the turnout.”302
CCI developed a website (www.cistparlament.com) that provided information such as voting
299
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history, salary, number of legislative proposals, for all parliamentarians up for election.

303

Recent activism CCI undertook involving ICT include the creation of a website in 2013 to
monitor “state and entity-level governments and parliaments and cantonal assemblies” as well as
“launched a new Internet-based television station highlighting civil society initiatives.”304
Community boost_r is an organization that began in 2012 as an online hub for those
interested in the connections between technology and reform in government, their website states
their focus is to “inspire, enable and promote tech for civil participation in transparency and
accountability initiatives in the Western Balkans.”305 The website indicates the organization has
received funding from large charitable organizations such as the Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy. Their website includes news, videos,
graphs and interactive features relating to technology in the political sphere—particularly in
relation to oversight. They also maintain online resources such as downloadable software so
citizens can create their own technology-centric projects. The site also includes a discussion
forum where users can exchange ideas and interact with others. The organization runs an online
“challenge” where users from BiH, Serbia, and Kosovo submit ideas of innovations and creative
uses of technology. These are vote on and winners get their project funded. 306
Community boost_r started a program called “Responsible Neighborhoods and Police
Forces” in which they set up a series of Facebook groups where each cities police force would
have a designated page. Using this, citizens could interact directly with the police and show
evidence of everything from illegal parking to bribery and corruption cases. This worked to
303
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instill accountability with the police force and to build a positive public connection and
importantly trust with them.

They also developed a cell phone app that allows users to

photograph instances of trash and pollution and submit it to local officials in charge of
community cleanup. Finally, the group developed an Android phone app and a Facebook group
of a “virtual parliament” which allowed users to learn about the legislative and legal processes of
the country as well as contact directly their elected representatives. This is a direct use of ICT to
link constituents to their government as users have two-way communication with MPs and
government agencies.307
The two examples listed show considerable effort from civil society to link citizens to
their government. Other organizations find that civil society is not yet matured enough to make
large inroads into consolidating democracy. FreedomHouse notes that “Civil society
organizations in BiH have acquired neither the social status nor the financial self-sufficiency to
play a major role in public life.”

308

The majority of funding comes from international sources

and groups with foreign money are regarded as “colonized by international actor.”309 Moreover,
some civil society organizations fully align themselves with political parties thus undermining
their credibility to be outside the scope of government and acting on good faith. Political leaders
do not often consult NGOs when making policy decisions.310
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Intergovernmental Organizations: 2005 to Present
Similar to NGOs, there are a healthy number of intergovernmental organizations (IGO)
operating in BiH.311 As discussed in the previous chapter, these organizations, made up delegates
from sovereign states, operate with the stated goal of transitioning BiH to a stable, consolidated
state. Several IGOs are perhaps more important to the future of BiH than NGOs as they have
direct influence over political matters per specifications of the Dayton Peace Accords. Below is a
chart of 15 IGOs with a presence in BiH. The chart gives an introduction to their presence
online. Citizen contact with IGOs is desirable as their decision have a direct impact on the lives
of average citizens—those living in Bosnia do not have a choice of voluntary association with
them as they would in civil society.
Table 3.3: List of IGOs Operating in BiH
Name of IGO

Website

Script

News

Contact

Web
2.0

Facebook

Twitter

YouTube

Council of Europe
EU Delegation Special
Representative to BiH (EUSR)
NATO (Sarajevo Office)
INTERPOL
International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia
International Organization for
Migration
OSCE in BiH
OHR
International Telecommunication
Union
UNDP in Bosnia
UNICEF Bosnia




Latin
Latin

X
312





X
X




X


X






English
English
Latin/Cyrillic







X

X
X
X





X



X





English





X

X

X

X





Latin/Cyrillic
Latin/Cyrillic
English






X


X
X
X


X



X


X
X





Latin/Cyrillic
Latin





X

X
X


X


X




World Intellectual Property
Organization
World Health Organization in Bosnia
IMF
World Bank



English

X



X











English
English
English





X



X
X
X


X



X



X
X

Source: Organization Websites. Listed in Index.
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The intergovernmental organizations had numerous features related to ICT interaction.
All but four had a Facebook page, nine had a Twitter account, and eight maintain a YouTube
channel. This at first seems surprising as IGOs work through proper and established diplomatic
channels when interacting with other states; however, as these are organizations with a global
reach and prominence, it would be in their best interest to be noticeable. The largest barrier is the
language divide as seven sites were not available in a native language. The following is brief
review of ICT activity involving two of the most prominent IGOs operating in BiH: the OHR
and the OSCE.
The Office of the High Representative exists to ensure the spirit and letter of the Dayton
Peace Accords and Bosnian Constitution are followed without the threat of extremism. As such,
ICT utilization does not operate in the same way as previous examples. The OHR does maintain
a website but other than a contact email there were no other tools, interactive or otherwise, for
the OHR to inform the public on what they are doing. A larger web presence would likely be in
the best interest of the OHR as 34% of those between 18-30 years of age believe the Office has
the most influence on the future of the country.313
Even though the virtual footprint is small, the actions of the OHR were likely a key
element in why ICT can flourish in the state. In 2001 the OHR established the Freedom of
Access to Information act for both entities, and therefore the entirety of the country. Bailard
asserts that because of this law, “there are no formal restrictions of content or use of ICT at the
government level. “314 This is supported by the US Department of State, which finds “[t]here
were no government restrictions on access to the Internet or reports that the government
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monitored e-mail or Internet chat rooms.”315 Brownlee’s theory asserts that those in charge of a
state will work within the system to achieve the ends they want. This should be coupled the
Diffusion of Innovations theory that states a society will implement technology in a way that
fulfills their needs. As the Office of the High Representative had particular control over this
matter, and the ends for the OHR is a pluralistic Bosnia-Herzegovina, the type of ICT
implemented in the state to fulfill this need was without restrictions, firewalls, or government
monitoring.316
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Bosnia
and Herzegovina “is one of the main promoters of civil society building. It works to support the
education reform process and to promote and protect the human rights of all citizens of BiH.”317
Another part of the OSCE’s stated mission is to assist states in security measures. In Bosnia, this
entails investigations of hate speech and threats. On the monitoring of hate speech, if someone is
threatened a legal case can be opened just like in a traditional crime but they do not advocate
extra laws, instead they rely on moderators and administrators to maintain a civil setting on their
forums. The OSCE helped steer online hate speech policy so as to fall in line with laws that
oversee conventional media and still ensure “Internet governance in BiH remains aligned with
European standards, permitting unrestricted access and freedom of expression.”318 This includes
education on the usefulness of self-moderation by administrators of chat rooms and forums
rather than implementing new government regulations. 319
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US Department of State. “Bosnia and Herzegovina Executive Summary.”
The 2001 Act does stipulate exemptions for defense, security, public safety, crime and prevention of crime.
317
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “What We Do,” Accessed March 2014. Available at
(http://www.oscebih.org/Default.aspx?id=1&lang=EN).
318
Casey, Taylor. “Governing the Internet: How easy is it to Cross the Line?” Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Accessed March 2014. Available at
(http://www.oscebih.org/News.aspx?newsid=311&lang=EN).
319
Udriste, Bogdan. “Increasingly Sophisticated Information Technology Infrastructure has Made a Secure
Cyberspace Vital to the Functioning of a State.” Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (2011).
316

113

In November of 2013 the OSCE developed an user generated website to collect and track
data on hate crimes. This is proposed as a positive step to end random, ethnic based violence as “
the interactive map of community conflict and cohesion aims to foster dialogue among local
authorities, civil society, and the judiciary in actively reducing the number of bias-motivated
incidents.”320 On civil society, the OSCE has work closely with the ITU to promote social media
and other ICT components to increase media freedom and freedom of assembly. A proposal
implemented involved the training of journalist to utilize web-based applications, such as
mapping tools and info-graphics. 321
Diaspora Community: 2005 to Present
The experience of the migrant and refugee Bosniak community in the decade after the
war was described as a “digital diaspora” because of the utilization of the Internet to connect
with other diaspora communities and their home country. The diaspora community showed
evidence of interacting with the government and people for reform. This section provides a
review of this community’s actions after 2005, with a focus on the world of two of the most
prominent diaspora organizations: the BiH World Diaspora Association and the Congress of
North American Bosniaks.
Scholars point out that Bosnians living in other countries have transitioned from a
“victim” identity, based largely on experiences from the civil war and refugee status, to a new
identity that is economic in nature. They no longer fear persecution if they were to return,
however the economic situation in BiH is poor and many stay abroad to enjoy the work and trade
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options available.322 Among the diaspora community there exists still a feeling of pride in BiH as
their home. Facebook groups establish this connection with the home country in forums on
everything from Bosnian pride to recipes to remembering the war.323 Young Bosniaks in
Germany use diaspora forums to discuss a wide range of broader political topics including
intern-ethnic marriage and integration into German society.324 Similarly, the International
Association of Students in Economic and Commercial Sciences (AIESEC), an organization that
provides leadership training to students, maintains a Bosnian branch that connects diaspora
students with those in country.325 The user generated social media website Reddit.com (64th
most popular website in the world according to Alexa.com) maintains a page on Bosnia
Herzegovina.
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The Reddit page, /r/bih , was started in November of 2010 and contains posts

and discussion on political topics, inter-ethnic relationships, and sports among other topics. The
users are approximately 60% BiH residents, 30% diaspora, and the rest from neighboring
countries. 327
Though the national dialogue continues, the focus for many organized groups, however,
is “trans-local” in nature in that lobbying efforts and fundraising is geared toward villages and
municipalities from which immigrants came. Many diaspora website emerged that specifically
address the issues these smaller communities face, and these websites have a global reach, such
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as the organization Klub Brčko in Melbourne that is focused on events in the Brčko District.328
Bosnians from a particular region living in Germany or Australia collectively raise money for
scholarships, public works efforts, money for ill relatives and in the case of Srebrenica and
Prijedor, “have campaigned for the recognition of genocide and the right to memorialize the
sufferings in their native towns.”329 The finances sent to family and friends back home are
substantial, they provide for 13- 20% of Bosnia’s national GDP, this is “six times more than
the amount of foreign direct investment and three times the amount of official development aid”
that Bosnia received in 2012.330 The diaspora efforts continue to resonate with the wider political
decisions of the state, Halilovich affirms “they act as lobbying and pressure groups, taking the
issues of war crimes, and return to and rebuilding of their ‘former’ hometowns, into the public
domain both in Austria and Bosnia. Increasingly, many of these activities take place in cyber
space, connecting different individuals, groups and places into a borderless digital diaspora.”331
The largest diaspora organization is the BiH World Diaspora Association (SSD BiH).
Started in 1999 from a diaspora network in Birmingham, UK, the SSD BIH acts as an organizing
umbrella organization for global groups. It was through the SSD BIH that the First BiH World
Diaspora Congress was organized in May of 2002.332 The SSD BiH encourages organizations to
implement their own visions and goals for the future of BiH and their respective communities.
The SSD BiH particularly “stresses the importance of education as the best possible investment
for the political, economic, cultural and scientific development of a democratic and prosperous
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BiH, as well as an open and free civil society.”333 It is involved in lobbying the government of
BiH for political reforms, including liberalization of visas, voting rights for diaspora citizens,
election reform, subsidizing teachers, purchasing of textbooks, and constitutional change to
greater emphasis youth, economics and “European standards.”334
The Congress of North American Bosniaks (CNAB) maintain the domain name
Bosniak.org and a web magazine on Bosniak.net. CNAB is a “National Umbrella Organization,
representing at least 350,000 Americans and Canadians of Bosniaks descent and origin. Its
membership is comprised of fraternal, educational, veteran, religious, cultural, social, business,
political organizations and individual members.”335 The organization’s website and newsletter
contain news of domestic politics in BiH and SNAB states it is “a strong voice in support of the
democratic process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and provided material and moral support for
democratic initiatives.”336 With that noted, it appears that the main focus of the organization is
the fostering of the diaspora community in the United States and Canada. It’s focus is
educational and culture efforts for Bosniaks to learn about cultural heritage. Of main concern for
the groups is remembrance and recognition of war crimes, including the Srebrenica Massacre.
The initiatives section of the group’s website is focused on “activism alerts” for groups that
deny or downplay war crimes, it links to a blog (http://srebrenica-genocide.blogspot.com) that
raises awareness of the 1995 killings. The accomplishment section contains news stories giving
praise to US and Canada government s and institutions that formally recognize the genocide.337

333

American University, “American University in Bosnia and Herzegovina News,” Accessed February 2014,
Available at (http://aubih.edu/en/news/news.php?ano=042).
334
World Diaspora Association of BiH, “About Us.”
335
Congress of North American Bosniaks, “About CNAB,” Accessed February 2014, Available at
(http://www.bosniak.org/about/).
336
Congress of North American Bosniaks, “About CNAB.”
337
Congress of North American Bosniaks, “Activism and Initiatives,” Accessed February 2014, Available at
(http://www.bosniak.org/cnab/activism/initiatives/).

117

The diaspora has two ICT prongs it uses to form discourse with those in the home country.
First are the user-driven network of social media websites such as Facebook, Reddit, blogs,
forums and message boards where issues and ideas are discussed. The second are the institutions
such as SSD Bih and CNAB who use the Internet as a way to communicate online their activities
off-line. Though both maintain Facebook and Twitter accounts, their main focus is information
dissemination. Diaspora communities are by their very nature out of state and thus unable to
participate in domestic politics the same way someone in the country can, they diaspora
community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the least those of the Bosniak ethnic group, have a rare
opportunity. They are economically important to the state and ICT allows them to communicate
in real time with citizens and political institutions back home. They can discuss democratic
principles and ideas with citizens not accustomed to such norms and lobby the state for reform.
Government and Politics: 2005 to Present
Using Bieber’s list of nationalistic political parties, below is an examination of their
online footprint. The goal is to see if the parties at the national level have embraced ICT and
incorporated Web 2.0 in their communication with the public. I included only social media
websites that were linked directly on the party pages as it was an indication that it was the
official site and not one made by a follower or detractor.
Table 3.4: National Party Websites in BiH
Party

Ethnicity

Nationalism

Website

338

SRS
SDS
SNSD

Serb
Serb
Serb

Extreme
Nationalist
Moderate

X



PDP

Serb

Moderate



Script

X
Cyrillic
Cyrillic/
Latin
Cyrillic

News

Contact

Web 2.0

Facebook

Twitter

Youtube

X



X



X
X
X

X



X



X



339



X

X

X

X

X

338

The SRS Party in Serbia (.rs domain) has a website with Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, and message board
features. However there was no indication it was also the main party website for the sister party in BiH.
339
News was mostly from July 2013, nothing up to date. Email was a Hotmail account, not a party email address.
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HSP
HDZ
HSS-NHI
SDA
SBiH
SDP

Croat
Croat
Croat
Bosniak
Bosniak
Bosniak

Extreme
Nationalist
Moderate
Nationalist
Moderate
Non-Nationalist

Source: Party Websites. Listed in Index.








Latin
Latin
Latin
Latin
Latin
Latin
















X

X
X
X


X
X




X
X
X
X
X


X
X
X


X

The above shows that only three of the political parties lack a Web 2.0 presence, it should
be noted, however that the Croat HSS-HNI party includes only a forum on their site. Of
particular interest here is the language barrier. Only one, the Serb SNSD (highlighted in grey),
provides both Latin and Cyrillic script for users. While the websites incorporate social media, the
language barrier keeps those who do not know the other language from interacting with the party
on their official site. This is not in-line with the principles of the ICT conflict resolution chart
because the participatory exchange of ideas is much harder to initiate if there is a language
barrier.
This is perhaps not surprising, as Turcilo finds, “Political parties and candidates still
consider the Internet as a “place for a better promotion”, rather than an additional
communication tool. Their on-line discourse is based on a paradigm of web 1.0, which means
that they prefer web sites in which they control the information flow, and that they are not ready
to open more, letting voices of citizens to be heard in their on-line presentation.”340 In the 2010
elections more than 48 political parties and fifteen independent candidates ran for 8,000 open
positions in either state, entity and/or cantonal parliaments. Of the 3 Million Euros total that were
spent, only 5% of that went towards Internet based advertisement. Of the 48 political parties, 31
had website but nine of the 31 had not been updated in the months before the election. The
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majority of the content was informational in nature with almost no cross-communication with
constituents. 341
The bureaucracy is the government institutions that implement policy that have a direct
impact on the daily lives of citizens. The online presence of government institutions allows for
citizens to communicate with them on questions and concerns they may have. The following is a
list of fifteen Federation of BiH ministry websites to assess their availability on the Internet.342
Table 3.5: Government Ministry Websites in the Federation of BiH
FBiH Government
Ministries

Website

Script

News

Contact

Web 2.0

Facebook

Twitter

Youtube

Agriculture, WaterManagement and
Forestry Ministry
Culture and Sports
Ministry
Displaced Persons and
Refugees Ministry
Education Ministry
Tourism Ministry
Finance Ministry
Health Ministry
Interior Ministry
Issues of Veterans and
Disabled Veterans
Ministry
Justice Ministry
Labor and Social Policy
Trade Ministry
Transport and
Communication Ministry
Ministry of Development,
Entrepreneurship, and
Crafts



Latin





X

X

X

X



Latin





X



X

X



Latin





X

X

X

X

X






X
Latin
Latin
Latin
Latin
Latin/ Cyrillic

X






X






X
X
X
X



X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X






Latin/ Cyrillic
Latin
Latin
Latin











X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X



Latin/ Cyrillic





X

X

X

X



Latin/ Cyrillic





X

X

X

X

Physical Planning
Ministry

Source: Ministry Websites. Listed in Index.
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Of these fifteen sites four are offered in both Latin and Cyrillic script. This perhaps
understandable as the majority of the Federation use the Latin script. Only three have any aspects
of Web 2.0, the Sports Ministry being the only site with an official linked Facebook page. From
this example, the listed ministries in the Federation lack the aspects of Web 2.0 to connect with
citizens. The following chart is an assessment of ten bureaucratic agencies operating in the
entirety of the state.
Table 3.6: Bureaucratic Agency Websites in BiH
Agency

Website

Script

News

Contact

Web
2.0

Facebook

Twitter

Youtube

National University and Library of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Central Bank of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Civil Aviation Directorate of BiH
Civil Service Agency of BiH
Directorate for European
Integration of Council of Ministers
of BiH
Election Commission of BiH
Foreign Investment Promotion
Agency of BiH
Statistical Agency of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Regulatory Agency for
Communications
Mine Action Center (BHMAC)



Latin





X

X

X

X



Latin/ Cyrillic





X





X





Latin/ Cyrillic
Latin/ Cyrillic
Latin/ Cyrillic









X
X


X



X



X
X
X




Latin/ Cyrillic
Latin/ Cyrillic







X
X

X


X


X
X



Latin/ Cyrillic







X



X



Latin/ Cyrillic







X

X

X



Latin/ Cyrillic







X

X

X

Source: Bureaucratic Agency Websites. Listed in Index.

The bureaucratic agencies bode much better than the FBiH ministries. All but the
National University and Library were available in both Latin and Cyrillic. Interestingly, some
national historical institutions are divided on language; for instance the assorted branches of the
Bosnian national archives are divided on .ba or rs.org depending on what Entity they are located.
The bureaucratic agencies did a better job of cross-communication with residents as the majority
had linked social network accounts and four had Web 2.0 capabilities (polls) on their main page.
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This is a positive note for e-government in BiH as national institutions are accessible to all
citizens at least in language and ability to contact.
The European Union (EU) defines eGovernment as “using the tools and systems made
possible by Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to provide better public
services to citizens and business.”343 The use of websites and online forms for bureaucratic
institutions allows citizens to engage with their government more easily than visiting a brickand-mortar branch of the facility. Studies show that the level of eGovernment in BiH is steadily
increasing with a majority (87%) of BIH municipalities has fully networked PCs with
applications on a central server.344 There is however mixed results. Collaboration between and
among agencies is not the norm and there is no central coordinating body to work between
municipalities. Furthermore, while forms can be downloaded and submitted, staff are often slow
to respond to email queries related to the processing of documents.345 To reach full potential,
“BiH state institution should realize that e-Government is not just implementation of IT projects;
it is part of the overall public administration reform.”346
The central question of this thesis is to investigate whether ICT is being used to mend
ethnic cleavages. One way to investigate mending of cleavages is the desire to make inter-ethnic
friendships; another is what vision citizens have for the future of the country (for example
dissolving the state or joining the European Union). As ethnic identity is enshrined in the
Constitution and championed by the political party structure, ethnic identity and inter-ethnic
relations carry, by their very nature, a political component. As the data shows the youth in BiH
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make up the overwhelming majority of Internet users. Their main concerns are jobs and the
overall economic future of the state, this is understandable as youth aged 18-30 have a 70%
unemployment rate.347 While they are proud of their ethnic and religious heritage, they want BiH
remain a sovereign state within its current borders. They are likely, especially in urban centers, to
desire inter-ethnic friendships, as one teen in Mostar stated "I believe that a difference between
Bosnjak and Croatian teenagers does not exist. Basically, we are all the same, only after the war
there are some 'constructed' differences."348
From this demographic 67% believe the EU should have the most influence on the future
of BiH and 49.9% say they are willing to leave BiH altogether.349 For the problems of the
country, they blame the government and politicians. As established in Chapter 2, the political
parties are prone to use ethnic nationalism as a banner for winning elections. Therefore, a
connection can be made to state that the at least some online activity in Bosnia, as it comes
primarily from the youth, will be centered less on exacerbating cleavages and more on pushing
for accountability and reform especially as an ends to increase favorability with the European
Union. The pervious sections of this chapter certainly touched on political activity of different
societal pillars. This final section continues this by examining cases of online activity for
political reform in the past 10 years to investigate whether interactions on the Internet transferred
to the off-line world. Social media is of particular interest as, depending on the site, allows users
to create profiles, add friends, and maintain contact. Scholarship finds that social media websites
increase the potential for positive face-to-face interactions especially for those who are of “the
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generation born after 1980 grew up with access to computers and the Internet and is therefore
inherently technology savvy.”350
There exist studies that find both the affirmative and negative; however a 2013 study on
social capital and pro-social behavior in Bosnia did find a correlation that finds “offline bridging
social capital can benefit from online interactions.”351 This positive transfer from online to
offline actions can “that transcend ethnic boundaries raising awareness about volunteering, and
promoting the development of civil society associations with cross-cutting membership.”352 Of
course the nature of the online activity and the site used is important. On sites that provide total
anonymity it is much less likely to yield fruitful results.353
One of the popular social media websites is Blogger.ba which monthly publishes 19,000
different posts. Posts are tagged into ten categories including news, technology, and politics.
Within the political topics is a category called United Bosnia and Herzegovina which users
discuss current events and activism. Also discussed are broader issues about the future of Bosnia
and the events of the 1992-1995 war. The message boards “do not carry nationalistic insults or
extreme language.”354
The most prominent social media website at this time is Facebook.com as it is the number
one site in Bosnia and the number two site globally.355 In terms of activism, in 2011 over 43,000
people joined a group supporting Ejup Ganic, a member of the BiH presidency arrested in
London and the request of Serbia. Similar groups for support of arrested former General Jovan
350
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Divjak garnered over 10,000 supporters.

Similarly, media organizations have linked the

February 2014 protest to Facebook and Twitter, and that these protests are centered around
unemployment and corruption.356 This low-risk activism of “liking” a Facebook page does not
mean that reform is imminent or that people will take to the streets. In February of 2011 the
Bosnian Labor Party, inspired by protests in neighboring Croatia, developed a Facebook page to
organize a protest against the government. Over 25,000 people joined the Facebook group and
the page had over 8,000 comments (ranging from support to disagreement with the planned
protest). When the day of the protest came no one showed up. The Labor Party tried two more
times to initiate the protests but it yielded the same results.357 This illustrates that while online
activity is regarded as a “powerful tool of communication in mobilizing protests and
demonstrations that can lead to social change” it does not necessarily indicate offline results are
certain. 358
Social movements to promote minority and womens’ rights have also used the Internet
as an organizing tool. In 2008 the organization DOSTA! (Romani word meaning “enough”), an
NGO focused on Romani human rights, mobilized protests largely through social media
networks in response to attacks on Romani teenagers in Sarajevo.

359

The DOSTA! website

includes videos, forums, newsletters and contact information for the group.360 In 2010 several
Bosnian NGOs partnered with Amnesty International for the 16 Days of Activism Against
Gender Violence campaign. The NGOs partnered in this program “produced six local digital
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stories dealing with the experience of female convicts.”361 A digital format was preferred over
conventional forms of activism as it was more cost effective and allowed a wider audience to be
reached.
Digital memorials for the war remembering violence in Sarajevo and Srebrenica are
evident on social media, especially blogs and image sharing sites such as Flickr. Users create
artwork at the site or take a photograph of the memorial and upload it to social media. From
there, other users can participate with the understanding of the vent through comments. James
finds the existence of these digital memorials “extends opportunities to participate in the
discussion and ‘‘share’’(repeat, rewrite, reinterpret, represent) experience within and beyond
users’ personal networks.”362 The exchange however is not always centered on reconciliation.
James notes that some comments are constructive and desire cooperation to understand and
accept the past; while others provide counter interpretations and believe the different ethnic
groups will remain divided.363
The issue of the citizenship identification number (JMBG) controversy, known as
Babylution, introduced in chapter I warrants further discussion as it dealt directly with ethnic
citizenship, access to basic rights, and access to the wider European Union. As noted in the
previous chapters, both the Babylution protests and visa reform are two points on which there is
broad inter-ethnic agreement and, as one scholar noted, “it represent for some the largest and
most significant example of social mobilisation in Bosnian post-war history.”364 The central
issue around the babylution protest arose when a debate occurred whether the a regional “entity”
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label should be added in the 13-digit BiH national ID number. This debate, which divided the
consociational parliament, caused the ID system to lapse and newborns were without ID and thus
without citizenship. This limited accessibility to medical centers, especially those in neighboring
states that had better facilities for certain medical conditions. As a result, at least one young girl
died because she was denied treatment due to lack of identification. At the time, the RS passed
an ordinance allowing its newborn citizens to gain entity citizenship. The Federation leadership
complained that this RS identification system was extra constitutional—according to the
constitution, is a federal matter—not something relegated to the entities.
Thousands of people took to the streets to protest the inability of the federal government
to rectify the situation. The protestors were mostly urban and young—members of youth
associations and NGO activists—gathered in front of the parliament to protest. These protests
were organized using social media.365 The protests had broad support over BiH, 95 percent in the
Federation and a lower, but still notable, 77 percent in the RS. Protestors made it clear that this
was intended to be a pan-ethnic protest with the main point of contention the political elite who
were, in their eyes, “maintaining political deadlocks under the pretext of endangered ethnonational interests.”366
With that noted, however, there was some political blowback. Croat and especially Serb
politicians blamed the protest on Bosniak nationalists and wrote it off as ethnic posturing.
Moreover, though the protest gained large national support both in attendance and on social
media, they were largely relegated to the Federation (Croat and Bosniaks) with few in the RS
(Serb) joining. Maksimovic describes the situation as thus, “The feeling of solidarity - mostly
expressed through social media remained latent in the Serb-dominated RS, whose equally
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dissatisfied citizens failed to raise their voice against political ills.”367 The JMBG empowered
citizens to mobilize and express dissatisfaction at the government for using ethnic political
banners to promote their cause while regular citizens were left disadvantaged. The protests,
though benefiting from cross-cleavage support, did not result in a change to laws nor did it start
protests in both Entities. As a show of support on the Internet for desiring ‘good government’
over standard fractured politics it was a victory, but it fell short of gaining off line ‘boots on the
ground’ action.
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Chapter IV: Implications of ICT in BiH: Revolution, Slacktivism, or Something in
Between?
In this thesis the central examination is of ethnic divisions and the use of information
technology to either mend or further divide the future of the Balkan state. The issue at hand is if
cleavages have control over their political and economic futures. Uncertainty of the future,
coupled with memories of bullets and bombs, fuel inter-ethnic stress. The desires espoused by
citizens help to elucidate what the future may hold. Below is a table of the hypotheses with the
findings from the research.
Table 4.1 Findings
Hypothesis
Citizens will utilize ICT to
interact with members
beyond their ethnic
community.

Expected
The exchange will
be inclusive, with
inter-ethnic
discussions.

Findings
Evidence indicates ICT
activity did include interethnic discourse.

The interaction will be
positive and ICT users will
mend cleavages and
promote civil society.

The exchange will
build upon mending
cleavages,
reconciliation, and
cooperation for
shared goals for a
unified state.
Some pro-status quo
and secessionist
actors use ICT to
build up established
cleavages.
Elite monitoring of
online activity to
maintain status-quo
is desirable.
Expected to find
substantial evidence
of intolerance in the
fractured society.
Ethnic rivalries
promote
devolutionist or
secessionist dialogue
online.

ICT activity largely
centered on day-to-day
issues of life. Some
discussion of politically
sensitive, inter-ethnic
issues. NGOs forefront
of political cooperation.
Limited instances of
ethnic rivalry and
negative interactions.

ICT users lobby for
EU membership for

Youth, who are
overwhelmingly ICT

ICT exchange could be
negative. Promoting
exclusion and
maintaining/broadening
cleavages
ICT usage is not limited by
the governmental control
will be inclusive.
ICT usage is illiberal in
nature, thus promoting
hatred or violence.
ICT is used to promote
dissolving the state

ICT users adopt panEuropean approach and

No evidence of
government involvement
in ICT to limit activity or
promote cleavages.
Limited instances of
illiberal behavior.

Online activity built
upon foundation of
continuing the state as a
single sovereign entity.
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Implications
ICT creates familiarity
with other ethnic
groups beyond the
users’ own
community.
ICT used in Building
foundations of interethnic cooperation
around shared
concerns. Foundations
of civil society
flourish.
Instances of cleavage
broadening events in
the minority; it does
not exacerbate
divisions.
ICT is beneficial for
open discourse as
dialogue and exchange
is not hindered.
ICT usage in BiH does
not exacerbate
cleavages.
Internet users,
especially the youth,
see the future of BiH
as a sovereign state
with a future outside of
fracturing the country.
Users want greater EU
cooperation and

promote working closer
with EU.

the entire country
with the goal of
economic and social
benefits of all
cleavages

users, hold the EU in
high regards. Want
access to EU markets as
evident through ICT
lobbying for visa reform.

There is insufficient
evidence that ICT is used
socially or politically

ICT use is utilitarian
in nature without
evidence of use other
than basic economic
transactions.

ICT is utilized to access
alternative media
sources, blogging,
chatting, and sociopolitical activism.

coordination with the
European Union. Use
of ICT to accentuate
this applies pressure to
political elite to
continue this path.
Alternative sources of
information are
accessed and two-way
discourse among
cleavages is present.
Building a foundation
for familiarity among
ethnic communities.

Based on the table 4.1, do ICT facilitate the mending of cleavages and promote a unified
state with the goal of EU accession? Yes, but not there is not as big an impact as expected.
Bosniak, Croat, and Serb youth are online, and they show evidence of mending cleavages and
desire to increase associations with the EU, as it is seen as the institution that should have the
most influence over the future of the state.368 Though no direct evidence was found that ICT
caused changes in behavior among the elites, it does build a foundation for inter-ethnic
relationships among citizens. The majority of the research is focused on general societal aspects
of ICT in relation to mending cleavages, not exclusively on cyberactivism lobbying for reform;
however the review of NGOs as well as the discussion on government did touch upon Internetbased activism. Anecdotal evidence of actors utilizing ICT for changing political conditions
outside of promoting ethnic cleavages exists. There was not, however, an abundance of evidence
illustrating that the technology has resulted in significant political shifts.
Why No Revolution 2.0?
Lessons of the Arab Spring “highlights the importance of avoiding the two faulty
extremes of either underestimating or overestimating the role of social media in triggering public
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mobilization and promoting political change”369 it is necessary to “avoided the technologically
deterministic approach which prioritizes the role of social media over face-to-face mass action in
bringing about political change…social media may be necessary, but are not sufficient, tools for
pursuing and achieving sociopolitical transformation.”370 ICT may have some very promising
aspects but it is not necessary a vector through which change can exclusively come—offline
action needs to be coupled with the online to achieve this goal. ICT should be used to strengthen
offline reform, not necessarily initiate or carry it to fruition.
ICT activism can manifest itself as “slacktivism” or “clicktivism,” in which actors exhibit
“willingness to perform a relatively costless, token display of support for a social cause, with an
accompanying lack of willingness to devote significant effort to enact meaningful change.”371
Essentially, “liking” something on Facebook or “re-Tweeting” a post gives the illusion of fully
and effectively participating in the political process and contributing to change when in fact little
is really accomplished.372 The UN data indicates that 39.9 percent of youth (18-30) describe their
“state of mind” as lethargic, while this is better than the numbers for Bosnians over 31 (53.6) it
still specifies that over a third of youth may be susceptible to exuding minimal effort to lobby for
change. An example of this in the discussion of the Labor Party protests in which the Facebook
page over 25,000 followers but no attendance at the event. Furthermore, the review of political
parties, including the discussion of the 2010 elections, revealed that the government relies little
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on ICT to engage voters and therefore they are somewhat insulated against the demands of
purely online action.373
Certainly there are instances of people using ICT to further the divide; one example is the
Facebook group that celebrated the Srebrenica Massacre. The findings indicate, however, that
instances of exacerbating cleavages are in the minority. There was evidence that citizens of BiH
utilized ICT to interact with members beyond their ethnic community and the nature of that
interaction was generally inclusive in nature. There is evidence that citizens used ICT to promote
reform on economic means and desired reforms on visa issues which allows greater access to the
EU.
Constructivist theory proposes that the elites are the agency who promote and direct
inter-ethnic attitudes—especially in a system where they are deemed the ethnic standard-bearers
by the Constitution. Political leaders fan the fears of a possible zero-sum ethnic future, yet the
end-game desire of elites appears to be accession in the European Union—not fracturing of the
state’s borders. The scholarship revealed that “none of the mainstream parties now dispute the
central political tenant that integration in Europe is the overarching aspiration of politics,
economy and society in BiH.”374 Certainly the IGOs, specifically the OHR, would frown upon
rhetoric and action that is deemed too extreme; moreover, the Constitution provides a veto
safeguard against action that could harm other ethnic communities. It is not in the interests of the
elites to continue divisions as this keeps the country further from EU accession; however it is
also not in the interest of the elites to end divisive rhetoric as this is how they retain power.
Changing attitudes from the youth utilizing ICT may negate the future prospect of divisive
rhetoric to be a tool for winning elections.
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ICT and NGOs: Foundation for Civil Society
ICT have a small role in some areas, most notably the long-term strengthening of civil
society. Inter-ethnic cooperation, even non-political in nature, can be regarded as political
because the foundation of the state is an ethnic based consociational system. Constructivist
theorists postulate that rhetoric and actions carry with them a political component.375 Moreover,
taking on political issues such as jobs and corruption shows a rejection of inter-ethnic tension
because it does not address notions of ethnic competition. Issues such as integrated education,
community groups, war remembrance, and support for political movements like the Babylution
protests received cross-ethnic support and did so in several instances on the Internet. Users of
ICT in BiH used Web 2.0 Internet technology to initiate the mediation process from the Conflict
resolution and Mediation Chart (Chart 3.1).
Users discussed issues such as inter-ethnic relationships; meet members of the diaspora
community; use online civil society crafted tools for accountability in government; meet students
from their segregated schools; discuss peace and reconciliation; and so on. Each tweet, like, upvote, share, post, comment, and message is another step to build familiarity and trust in an
environment where cleavages and distrust are too normal. This is a digital fulfilment of the
Contact Hypothesis in which even minimal interaction can reduce prejudice, an online version of
Bosniaks meeting Croats because the Croat pub has a pool table.
The NGOs have shown to be a promising tool in bridging cleavages in line with the
Contact Hypothesis and they are the key for reform over the long term lies with continued and
strengthened efforts by NGOs. The NGOs operating in Bosnia as enjoying a large reach and
abundant influence. The NGO webpages indicate that efforts to add transparency to government
and educated voters had an influence on the 2010 elections. If NGOs utilize Web2.0 tools they
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will more efficiently communicate their goals and enjoy a “broader range of potential
supporters.”376 Long term NGO goals for mending the cleavages should utilize ICT, “ being an
effective social movement means utilizing social media… transition[s] to democratization and
reform will likely depend on the continuing use of social media by the public to ensure that
democracy takes root and leads to permanent and profound change.”377 The multimedia center at
the Zavidovići Library training future journalists to use the Internet and the cell phone app that
shows voting histories, when coupled with inter-ethnic discourse on net, could lead to an
inclusive future where divisive rhetoric will no longer work at the ballot box. NGOs should be
strategic in their efforts, emphasizing the grassroots qualities to avoid accusations that they are
merely agents of foreign governments working to fulfill foreign policy of another state.
NGOs like the League of Women Voters, The Youth Initiative for Human Rights, and the
International Commission on Missing Persons are exemplary for their ability to bridge intergroup
divides and bring people together on equal footing for a shared, common goal. The use of ICT
can bridge the problem of geographic isolation which hampers the success of intergroup
interaction. The growth of NGOs, especially ones that include intergroup interaction focused on
reconciliation, coupled with access to new digital forms of communication, is the best way to
increase civil society and mend the fissures of the country.378
Moreover, NGO focus on grassroots efforts are equally necessary, especially to engage
and encourage participation to those in the younger demographic, as the youth show a desire to
leave BiH altogether to improve their future, thus the state may lose a valuable resource. The
youth provide the generational change for the country, if they were to leave in large numbers, the
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country would stagnant from this lost demographic. The potential brain-drain of youth is a real
possibility. The poor economic conditions provide the push to the leave the country, while news
of a better life from the diaspora community provides the pull. The NGO use of ICT has positive
effects in democracies moving toward consolidation; namely allowing diverse media and
learning of norms in consolidated states. There is, however, a darker side in poor performing
democracies. In these states the Internet shows correlation with a desire to “abandon the current
elected system of government if problems are not resolved quickly.”379
Furthermore, there is the risk that states with a history of strong leaders (dictatorships)
may experience an authoritarian resilience in which citizens in troubled states prefers the
stability of non-democratic institutions to the uncertainty of democracy that falters.380 This is not
to say that strong-men style of government is preferred or a forgone, inevitable conclusion in the
Balkans. There is however precedence for it and leaders may try to carry the torch once held by
Tito; citizens who had comfort and security during those times may be receptive to the derailing
of democracy. For this reason it is crucial that civil society flourish and strengthen democratic
foundations in the post-conflict state.
NGOs have the ability to engage the youth and convince them that remaining in the state
necessary and change is viable. In this way the state retains a key tool for reform. The people of
Bosnia must decide what they want the future to hold, be it continued nationalism, populism, or
another form of government. The possibility of changes in BiH is very real as a convention to
discuss and possibly reform the BiH Constitution is tentatively scheduled to take place on the
20th anniversary of the end of the conflict in 2015.
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Is Membership with the European Union Optimal for the Future of BiH?
Joining the European Union is perhaps realistically the best available option for
maintaining peaceful relations in the region. The Yugoslav Wars of the early 1990s focused on
the devolution of Yugoslav territories into sovereign states. These new states were largely cut
along established ethnic territory. The primary point of contention is, and somewhat has been
since the idea of a Pan-Yugoslav state was first formulated, the future of the Bosniak people.
Histoircally, Bosniaks were claimed by both the Croat and Serb political elite as “belonging” to
their camp. These are the same camps that are most likely to put forth nationalist rhetoric directly
at the expense, and often in opposition to, the Bosniaks. They have served as both a prize and a
scapegoat for national aspirations. If an option for a non-status quo future of the state other than
joining the EU were sought, it would need to include the considerations of the Bosniaks who
would form a vulnerable minority in either a Serb or Croat state. The two main Entities in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Repulika Srpska, were
designed by the Dayton Agreement to provide a safe space, or buffer zone, for ethnic cleavages.
The reality however is much more complicated. The Cantons, Municipalities, towns, and
neighborhoods are often mixed among the three groups—a velvet divorce along gerrymandered
lines is not likely to yield constructive results. This is especially true in the larger cities such as
Sarajevo, which witnessed many tragic events during the conflict.
Though Bosnia Herzegovina was given a roadmap for accession and received guidance
from the EU in the form of the EU delegation to BiH, there remain questions of whether the EU
would take in Bosnia as a member state at this time. The European Union and the OHR/EUSR is
in a challenging position. If policies are stringently enforced, they will be accused of meddling in
domestic affairs and keeping the state in a state of political infancy. If policies allow for nuances
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and are considered lax in enforcement, the charge will be that they are too ineffective to promote
change. This is truly a difficult and delicate situation for the EU to navigate.
A number of experts assert that “European leaders and many EU citizens remain cautious
about further EU enlargement,” of states in poor economic or social conditions; especially after
the economic crises of Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, Italy, Portugal and Greece.381 Certainly the EU
through the EUSR/OHR holds inter-ethnic cooperation as priority; however The EU roadmap
plans for BiH appear to stress the securing of borders, immigration, and illegal trafficking as a
higher priority than economic growth. In other words, items that help the EU within its current
border and not overwhelmingly lifting BiH to a point where membership status is viable in the
eyes of established, member states. There is also the issue of expansion fatigue in which
European Union member states are reluctant to add members to the ‘club.’ Especially in the
instance of state that has serious issue of interethnic discord. The enlargement fatigue is the
reason why notions of future additions to the EU are on “life support' and flat lining.”382
The EU is described as having a “credibility gap” among the Bosnia political leaders.383
The positions and procedures for mending the future of the state may be direct but at times they
are not fully followed to fruition, or given protocol on how BiH leaders can undertake the task
required. A clear example of this is the divided police forces in the state that, though were called
for full integration, remain nationalistic organizations. Moreover, EU member states have not put
forth a unified position on how the BiH Constitution should be reformed in the wake of joining
the EU, especially since representatives from the state will need to be elected to serve in the
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Parliament of the European Union. The execution of the roadmap process for BiH illustrates the
EU is “deeply divided, incoherent, and weak in terms of its Europeanizing policies in Bosnia
thus further deepening political impasse in the country.”384 The credibility gap allows BiH
politicians to “successfully manipulate” the sometimes ambiguous platitudes put forth by EU
leaders so that the status quo remains with the gilded appearance of progress. 385
The credibility gap is a symptom of the enlargement fatigue as EU leaders from member
states are not yet ready to answer the question of whether Bosnia should join the economic and
political union, thus a realpolitik approach of protracted efforts with underfunded mandates,
lacking a system for policy implementation.386 Politically ‘kicking the can down the road’ is
good for neither the EU or BiH. The credibility gap allows Bosnian elites to maintain ethnic
divisions as the way to retain power and skirt both reporting and responding to human rights
issues and poverty.387 For the European Union, a failure in Bosnia would be a substantial
diplomatic and ideological defeat for the IGO as it seeks to promote its philosophy, economic,
and political systems as preeminent on the world stage. The future of Bosnia will likely stand as
either one of the first major successes or failures of the EU. In the current geopolitical climate
that sees a resurging Russian-dominated economic sphere, success in the Balkans is of certain
importance for the EU.
ICT Adaption in Post-Conflict States
The diffusion of ICT into BiH was not driven by elites who sought to implement it for
their own gain, under their personal control as is often the case with traditional media. The work
of international partners, most notably the OSCE and the OHR, to establish rules for new media
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allowed an open Internet to flourish. This was certainly helped by the liberalization of the
economy in the post-communist state. The lessons to be taken from the case of ICT in Bosnia is
that foundations for ICT in post-conflict states should be guided by impartial international
partners whose goals include equality of access and open use for citizens.
Assessment of ICT in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Under the Diffusion of Innovations Theory and Brownlee’s study on authoritarian states,
it was expected that the type of Internet implemented would be limited in scope so as to not pose
a threat to the elites. The Diffusion of Innovations Theory (DIT) asserts that states will
implement technology based on the criteria and purpose they see fit. As BiH operates under a
liberalized economic market, certainly one much more open than the communist state operated
economy of Tito, and, more importantly, the domestic policy is subject to approval by
international authorities, the Internet in BiH is free and open. In cases of less-free states the
government regulation of the Internet is commonplace. As the elite of BiH benefit from ethnic
discord, I fully expected this to be continued into the nature of how ICT works in the Balkan
county. This assessment is not accurate because the OHR (and to an extent the market) provides
the final check and balance of policy; therefore, according to the DIT and Brownlee, the type of
ICT implemented in the state will be one favorable to the openness and ethnic heterogeneity of
the market and international partners.
Scope Limitations
The primary points of limitation in this study are the language barrier of accessible
literature and the availability of quantitative data. The secondary source information utilized in
this thesis is almost exclusively written in English. A number of quality academic journals and
texts exist that are written in other languages which could provide a greater level of discourse on
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the subject. Of particular interest are the scholarly publications produced in Eastern Europe and
the Balkans. The second limitation of this study is the statistics available. The field of ICT and
politics continues to grow and more statistical data is collected each year. With that said, the
field is still young; the Journal of Information Technology and Politics, perhaps the premier
academic journal on the subject, was only established in 2004. As scholars in the field,
governments, IGOs, and NGOs collect data and conduct surveys, more resources will be
available for the further understanding of ICT and society.
Suggestion for Future Research
Possibilities for the future research include a more in-depth study of e-government, the
use of ICT by political parties and in elections, the nature of citizen discourse on Web 2.0
websites. The use of information technology by the bureaucracy reveals the prevalence of the
medium as a standard and fruitful method for communicating and operating with the citizenry.
Greater Internet diffusion in the state creates more opportunities for citizens to interact with the
various ministries and governmental institutions and encourage reform; as well as receive and
send documents permits in a neutral environment. These transactions could otherwise be subject
to ethnic prejudice in a face to face meeting, as was the case with NGOs planning programs. A
more thorough study of e-government yields greater incite in to ICTs and society. Similarly, the
use of ICT by political parties and to organize for campaigns reveals the nature of the discourse
between the elected official and the voter in a non-traditional format, particularly the youth voter.
Also, studying the use of ICT for get-out-the-vote efforts is integral to ICT and politics. Finally,
the content of messages, comments, and posts on the various Web 2.0 websites (YouTube,
Facebook, etc) reveals the content of the discourse and whether it is inclusive or exclusive. For
all of these suggestions, a strong foundation in the local language is necessary.
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Implications for Future Cases
The findings in this study are perhaps applicable to other instances of post-conflict states
addressing issues of societal fissures. Case studies of Northern Ireland, Syria, Kurdish regions of
Iraq and Turkey, and Lebanon among others. These states have the ICT infrastructure to bridge
the digital divide and have cleavages similar to those of the Balkans.

Moreover, their

parliamentary systems allow for diverse political parties that could operate as the political wing
of an ethnic or religious group. This is certainly the case in Northern Ireland where political
parties, and the future of the state, are often divided along ethnic and religious lines; also in
Lebanon which has a confessional political system similar to the consociational system of
Bosnia.
Conclusion
UN data shows citizens along all demographic lines retain strong pride in ethnic and
religious groups. This is expected as these qualities are promoted by the elites; yet, there does not
appear to be a strong ICT based effort to divide the state. The data indicates that the youth, who
are the majority of the Internet users, have positive feelings about accession in the EU and they
are concerned with economic issues and corruption above. It should be noted that no evidence
was found that the youth desire economic opportunities for their own ethnic group while the
other remains stagnant or declines. The youth are more likely to desire and seek out inter-ethnic
friendships—indeed, the interviews and quantitative studies reviewed indicate they see
themselves as more similar than different. There is perhaps not a ‘smoking gun’ that shows ICT
to be sole vector through which changes will be made possible, but it does contribute to a
growing foundation on reform based on inter-ethnic cooperation, peace-building, and
reconciliation. As we have seen elsewhere The transition to a consolidated multi-ethnic state is a
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difficult one. Political elites gain and maintain power by promoting ethnic divisions and are
unlikely to change course if it means losing power. Yet, “the importance of social media has to
be recognized by the leaders of the Balkan countries…[i]n order to prosper and keep up in the
rapidly changing information society, to build a viable, respected and competitive Balkan
community, policy makers, academic, business and political leaders must join together to take
action.”388 People are a product of the structure in which they operate. Human agency is dynamic
and cultural shifts, albeit slow, are not uncommon. ICT in BiH today may not show overarching
results of societal change, but it is present and has provided a number of examples of both
bridging divides and promoting civil society.
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Appendix of Websites Used
NGO Websites
Name of NGO
Centre for Civic Initiatives
Centre for Free Access to Information
Centre for Peace and Multiethnic Cooperation
Community boost_r
International Forum Bosnia
Media Plan Institute
Napredak Croat Cultural Society
Open Society Fund
Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo
Transparency International BiH
Youth Network of BiH

Website
http://www.ccibh.org/main.php
http://www.cspi.ba/
http://www.centarzamir.org.ba/bono/index-bonosanela.html
http://communityboostr.org/home?cb=en
http://www.ifbosna.org.ba/index.php?lang=hr
http://www.mediaplan.ba/
http://www.napredak.com.ba/
http://www.soros.org.ba/
http://www.idc.org.ba/
http://www.ti-bih.org/default.aspx
http://www.omladina-bih.net/

IGO Websites
Name of IGO
Council of Europe
EU Delegation Special
Representative to BiH (EUSR)
IMF
International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
International Organization for
Migration
International
Telecommunication Union
INTERPOL
NATO (Sarajevo Office)
OHR
OSCE in BiH
UNDP in Bosnia
UNICEF Bosnia
World Bank
World Health Organization in
Bosnia
World Intellectual Property
Organization

Website
http://www.coe.ba/web/index.php
http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/?akcija=arhiva&mjesec=03&g
odina=2010&jezik=2
http://www.imf.org/external/country/bih/
http://www.icty.org/
http://www.iom.ba/
https://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx
http://www.interpol.int/
http://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/hqsarajevo.aspx
http://www.ohr.int/
http://www.oscebih.org/oscebih_eng.asp
http://www.undp.ba/
http://www.unicef.org/bih/
http://www.worldbank.org/
http://www.who.int/countries/bih/en/
http://www.wipo.int/portal/en/index.html

Political Party Websites
Acronym
Website
SNSD
http://www.snsd.org/

Party Name
Alliance of Independent Social
Democrats
Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia

HDZ

http://www.hdzbih.org/
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and Herzegovina
Croatian Party of Rights of Bosnia
and Herzegovina
Croatian Pleasant Party- New
Croatian Initiative
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina
Party of Democratic Action
Party of Democratic Progress
Serbian Democratic Party
Serbian Radical Party
Social Democratic Party of Bosnia
and Herzegovina

HSP

http://hsp-bih.ba/

HSS-NHI http://www.hss-nhi.ba/
SBiH
SDA
PDP
SDS
SRS
SDP

http://www.szabih.com/
http://sda.ba/home/
http://www.pdpinfo.net/
http://www.sdsrs.org/
http://www.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/389
http://www.sdp.ba/

FBiH Ministry Websites
FBiH Government Ministries
Agriculture, Water-Management and Forestry Ministry
Culture and Sports Ministry
Displaced Persons and Refugees Ministry
Education Ministry
Finance Ministry
Health Ministry
Interior Ministry
Issues of Veterans and Disabled Veterans Ministry
Justice Ministry
Labor and Social Policy
Ministry of Development, Entrepreneurship, and Crafts
Physical Planning Ministry
Tourism Ministry
Trade Ministry
Transport and Communication Ministry

Website
http://www.fmpvs.gov.ba/
http://www.fmks.gov.ba/
http://www.fmroi.gov.ba/
http://www.fmon.gov.ba/
http://www.fmf.gov.ba/
www.fmoh.gov.ba
http://www.fmup.gov.ba/
http://www.fmbi.gov.ba/
http://www.fmp.gov.ba/
http://www.fmrsp.gov.ba/
http://www.fmrpo.gov.ba/
http://www.fmpu.gov.ba/
www.fmoit.gov.ba
http://www.fmt.gov.ba/
http://www.fmpik.gov.ba/

Bureaucratic Agency Sites in BiH
Agency
Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Civil Aviation Directorate of BiH
Civil Service Agency of BiH
Directorate for European Integration of Council of Ministers of BiH
Election Commission of BiH
Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of BiH
Mine Action Center (BHMAC)
National University and Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina
389

Website for the party in Serbia.
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Website
http://www.cbbh.gov.ba/
http://www.bhdca.gov.ba/
http://www.ads.gov.ba/
http://www.dei.gov.ba/
http://www.izbori.ba/
http://www.fipa.gov.ba/
http://www.bhmac.org/
http://www.nub.ba/

Regulatory Agency for Communications
Statistical Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

http://www.rak.ba/
http://www.bhas.ba/
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